纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英韩国最高情报机构官员被指控向中国泄露卧底特工名单

An official at South Korea’s top military intelligence agency leaked classified data, including a list of undercover operatives, to a suspected Chinese intelligence agent for years in exchange for cash, defense officials said Friday.

韩国国防官员周五表示，韩国最高军事情报机构的一名官员多年来向疑似中国情报人员泄露机密数据，包括卧底特工名单，以换取酬劳。

The 49-year-old civilian employee at the Korea Defense Intelligence Command was arrested last month and formally indicted Tuesday on charges including bribery and handing over sensitive data, via documents or voice messages, 30 times since 2019.

韩国国防情报司令部的这名49岁的文职雇员在7月被捕，并于上周二被正式起诉，罪名包括受贿，以及自2019年起30次将敏感数据通过文件或语音信息转交给他人。

The leaked information included a list of undercover agents from the command who were operating in China, Russia and other countries, military prosecutors said at a briefing this week, according to the defense ministry. The command specializes in spying on North Korea, a heavily militarized country that often threatens its southern neighbor.

据韩国国防部的说法，军事检察官在上周的吹风会上表示，泄露的信息包括在中国、俄罗斯和其他国家为韩国国防情报司令部秘密工作的特工名单。韩国国防情报司令部专门从事针对朝鲜的间谍活动，朝鲜是一个高度军事化的国家，经常威胁其南部邻国。

The leak has raised awkward questions for South Korea because it comes at a time when the country is expanding military intelligence sharing with the United States and Japan to help guard against North Korea and China. South Korea and the United States have depended on each other to spy on North Korea, combining resources such as satellites, cyber intelligence and human agents, like those working for the command.

这给韩国带来了一些尴尬的问题，因为为了帮助提防朝鲜和中国，它正在扩大与美国和日本的军事情报共享。韩美在针对朝鲜的间谍活动上相互依赖，两国共享卫星、网上情报，以及特工人员（如为该司令部工作的人员）等资源。

The leak, first uncovered in June, has prompted the Defense Intelligence Command, one of South Korea’s most secretive government agencies, to recall undercover agents based overseas back home.

泄密事件最初是今年6月被发现的，促使韩国最秘密的政府机构之一国防情报司令部召回驻扎海外的卧底。

Undercover agents have been active in China, where they have tried to recruit spies and collect intelligence among North Koreans who traveled there or among ethnic Koreans in China who often traveled to North Korea. But their undercover identities were sometimes exposed and they became targets of the authorities in China as well as undercover North Korean counterintelligence agents operating there.

韩国的秘密特工一直在中国活动，他们试图在那里招募间谍，从去中国旅行的朝鲜人或经常在中朝之间往返的朝鲜族人当中收集情报。但他们的卧底身份有时会暴露，让他们成为中国当局以及在中国秘密工作的朝鲜反间谍特工的打击目标。

Investigators are still assessing the scale of damage done to South Korea’s decades-old intelligence war against North Korea, as South Korean lawmakers and media have voiced suspicions that the data may have eventually gone to Pyongyang.

调查人员仍在评估泄密事件给韩国对朝鲜数十年情报战造成的损害规模，韩国的立法者和媒体怀疑这些数据最终可能流向平壤。

The indicted official, whose identity was not revealed by prosecutors, was secretly detained and blackmailed into working for the suspected Chinese agent in Yanji in northeastern China, in April 2017, according to military prosecutors. He was in the city, near the North Korean border, to check on his intelligence-gathering network there, they said.

据军事检察官的说法，这名被起诉的官员曾在2017年4月在中国东北的延吉市遭秘密拘留，并被要挟为疑似中国特工的人工作。检察官没有透露这名韩国官员的名字。他们表示，此人去那个靠近朝鲜边境的城市是为了检查那里的情报收集网。

He printed documents, and took memos or screenshots of classified documents, as well as taking cellphone pictures of them. He smuggled them out and sent them through China-based, password-protected cloud services or through a voice-messaging function within an online gaming app. In return, he has received at least $120,000 from his Chinese contact, military prosecutors said.

他将文件打印出来，对机密文件做了笔记或屏幕截图，还对一些文件进行了手机拍照，然后将这些文件偷带出来，用有密码保护的中国云服务或一款在线游戏应用的语音短息功能发送给中方。军事检察官称，他从中国联系人那里拿到了至少12万美元的回报。

“Check the file I have sent,” the official was quoted as saying in a message to his Chinese contact. “If you pay me more, I will share more.”

“查一下我已发的文件，”这名韩国官员在发给他的中国联系人的一条短信中写道。“如果你付给我更多的钱，我会分享更多文件。”

Criminal charges brought against the official included taking bribes and violating laws on protecting military intelligence. Prosecutors said they were still investigating whether the suspected Chinese agent was linked to North Korea.

对这名官员提出的刑事指控包括收受贿赂和违反军事情报保护法。检察官表示，他们仍在调查那名被怀疑是中国特工的人是否与朝鲜有关系。

The South Korean intelligence authorities first learned of a possible leak at the command after their hacker discovered a list of South Korean undercover agents while snooping on North Korean computer networks, according to the office of Kim Min-seok, a senior lawmaker at South Korea’s main opposition Democratic Party, which first alerted media to the breach.

韩国主要反对党新民党的资深议员金珉锡（音）的办公室首先向媒体通报了泄密事件。韩国情报部门最初获悉国防情报司令部可能存在泄密是因为，此前他们的黑客在监控朝鲜计算机网络时发现了一份韩国秘密特工名单。

The last time a major leak was reported at the command was in 2018, when an affiliated active-duty military officer was found to have sold classified information to foreign agents in China and Japan through a retired South Korean intelligence officer. The information he sold reportedly included data on the command’s agents in China and on North Korean weaponry.

最近一次对韩国国防情报司令部发生重大泄密事件的报道是2018年，那次是发现一名隶属于该司令部的现役军官通过一名退休的韩国情报官员向中国和日本的外国特工出售机密信息。据报道，此人出售的信息包括韩国国防情报司令部在中国的特工，以及朝鲜武器数据。

“The latest case raises serious questions about the ethics of an agent — this kind of leak threatened the lives of other South Korean agents abroad — and about the system that has failed to catch him for so long,” said Yoo Dong-ryul, a security analyst and head of the Korea Institute of Liberal Democracy who has been studying the intelligence war between the two Koreas.

“最近这起泄密案引发了人们对特工的道德准则，以及对这么长时间未能将其抓获的体制的严重质疑，这种泄密威胁了其他韩国海外特工的生命安全，”韩国自由民主研究所所长兼安全分析师柳东烈（音）说，他长期研究朝鲜半岛的情报战。

It was still unclear how extensive the latest leak was. Investigators did not cite any of the exposed agents or informants as operating inside North Korea. The leak did include information on the command’s structure and operational methods, they said.

目前还不清楚最近这次泄密事件的影响范围有多广。调查人员没有提及任何在朝鲜境内活动的特工或线人身份遭暴露的情况。他们表示，泄密内容包括韩国国防情报司令部的内部结构和运作方法。

Kim Yong-hyun, who was appointed as defense minister earlier this month, vowed to take “extraordinary measures” to address any problems discovered during the investigation.

今年8月早些时候被任命为韩国国防部长的金容铉发誓采取“特别措施”，以解决调查中发现的任何问题。

The Defense Intelligence Command’s undercover agents did some of South Korea’s most dangerous spy work. Unlike other agents who operated with diplomatic immunity, many of them did not carry diplomatic visas, and posed as businessmen, which left them vulnerable to arrests, threats and blackmail in countries like China.

韩国国防情报司令部的秘密特工从事的是该国最危险的一些间谍工作。与其他享有外交豁免权的特工不同，他们中的许多人不持外交护照，而是假扮成商人，这使得他们容易在中国等国家遭到逮捕、威胁和勒索。

One such agent helped the manager of a North Korean restaurant in China defect to South Korea with a dozen waitresses in 2016.

韩国国防情报司令部的一名特工曾在2016年帮助中国一家朝鲜餐馆的经理带着十几名女服务员叛逃韩国。

But in 1998, a lieutenant colonel at the command who was working undercover in Dandong, a Chinese city near its border with North Korea, was kidnapped to North Korea. After he was released six months later, he revealed during his debriefing that North Korean interrogators tortured and blackmailed him with threats to kill his family in the South.

但1998年也曾发生过一名在离朝鲜边境不远的中国城市丹东秘密工作的韩国国防情报司令部中校被绑架到朝鲜的事情。六个月后，他被释放，他在接受盘问时透露，他受到朝鲜审讯人员的酷刑和勒索，朝鲜威胁要杀死他在韩国的家人。

The officer was released only after he identified other South Korean undercover agents in northeastern China and promised to work as a double agent for the North, according to “Covert Operations,” a 2018 book about the undercover agents.

据2018年出版的有关卧底特工的《秘密行动》一书，这名特工交出了在中国东北地区活动的其他韩国秘密特工的名单，并承诺为朝鲜当双重间谍后，他才得以获释。