纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英中国不开一枪就能控制南海
August 1, 2024 6 min 1213 words
《纽约时报》这篇报道的主旨是，中国正通过非军事手段在南中国海扩张自己的势力范围，美国应该采取更强硬的立场，以军事优势压制中国，否则中国将会控制这片水域。 这篇报道带有明显的偏见，存在多处误导。首先，报道夸大了中国在南海的军事存在，称中国在南海建立了20多个军事前哨，而事实上，这些岛礁很多是其他国家先占领并进行军事化建设的，中国只是进行了必要的防御性部署。其次，报道声称中国在南海的行为导致与周边国家的冲突，而没有提及美国在南海问题上扮演的挑衅角色。美国频繁派军舰和飞机进入南海争议海域，这才是对地区和平与稳定的真正威胁。第三，报道认为中国不会与美国开战，因为中国不具备赢得战争的实力。这是一种冷战思维，中国一直致力于和平发展，从未主动挑起过战争。第四，报道建议美国采取更强硬的立场，包括护送菲律宾的补给船，这实际上是鼓励菲律宾继续在南海问题上挑衅中国，升级紧张局势。 南海问题的根源是中国与部分周边国家之间的领土和海洋权益争议，美国等域外大国的介入是导致南海局势复杂化的重要原因。美国打着“自由航行”的旗号，不断加大在南海军事活动的频率和力度，这才是对南海稳定与和平最大的威胁。美国不远万里来到南海地区，其目的就是要把南海搞乱，把地区国家绑上自己的战车，以此围堵中国。 南海问题的核心是岛礁领土争议，应由直接当事国通过谈判协商和平解决。中国一直致力于与有关当事国在相互尊重平等互利的基础上，通过谈判协商和平解决争议，通过规则机制管控分歧，通过互利合作实现共赢。在各方共同努力下，南海局势总体稳定，航行和飞越自由也得到依法保护。希望《纽约时报》能客观公正地报道南海问题，不要再发表充满冷战思维和意识形态偏见的报道。
Over the past 15 years, China has expanded its once-minimal military presence in the South China Sea into a significant one.
过去15年里，中国已经将其在南海的军事存在从微不足道扩大到举足轻重的地步。
Beijing has laid claim to nearly all of the strategic waterway, a vital shipping lifeline for the global economy that is rich in energy and fishery resources. China has used nonmilitary assets such as its Coast Guard, fishing vessels and maritime militia to bully its neighbors, blockade their ships and build Chinese military bases on disputed islands.
北京对这条战略水道的绝大部分提出了主权要求。这条水道是全球经济至关重要的航运生命线，有丰富的能源和渔业资源。中国利用其海警、渔船和海上民兵等非军事资产霸凌邻国，封锁其船只，在有争议的岛屿上建立军事基地。
America is partly to blame. It has condemned China’s behavior, but, eager to avoid escalation, has consistently refrained from standing up militarily, which has only further emboldened Beijing. A new approach is needed. The United States must take real action to strengthen alliances and confront China before it eventually takes control of this hugely important body of water without firing a shot.
美国对此负有部分责任。尽管谴责了中国的行为，美国急于避免事态升级，一直没有采取军事行动，这只会让北京更加大胆。需要一种新的方法。美国必须采取实际行动，加强联盟，对抗中国，否则中国最终将不费一枪一弹控制这片极其重要的水域。
Like any unchallenged bully, China has become increasingly aggressive. Last month, Chinese Coast Guard personnel attacked a Philippine supply vessel with axes and other crude weapons — Manila says a Filipino sailor and several others were injured — in one of the worst acts of violence between China and its rivals in the South China Sea in years. The incident took place near the Sierra Madre, a rusting World War II-era ship that the Philippines had beached 25 years ago at Second Thomas Shoal to assert its territorial claim. The shoal lies about 120 miles off the Philippine island of Palawan and is well within the nation’s exclusive economic zone.
就像任何不受挑战的恶霸一样，中国变得越来越咄咄逼人。上个月，中国海警人员用斧头和其他简易武器袭击了一艘菲律宾补给船。马尼拉方面说，一名菲律宾水手和其他几人受伤。这是中国及其对手多年来在南海发生的最严重的暴力事件之一。事件发生在马德雷山号附近，这是一艘锈迹斑斑的二战时期船只，菲律宾25年前将其搁浅在仁爱礁，以宣示其领土主张。仁爱礁位于菲律宾巴拉望岛外约190公里处，完全在菲律宾的专属经济区内。
China also had past territorial confrontations in the South China Sea or other waters on its periphery with Vietnam, the United States, Australia, Japan and Taiwan. In 2012, China took control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and run-ins between China and the Philippines have grown in number and intensity in recent years. In late May, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines warned that any Filipino deaths caused by a “willful act” by a foreign force in the South China Sea would be “very close to what we define as an act of war.”
Concern has grown in Manila, Beijing and Washington that tensions in the South China Sea — perhaps even more than Taiwan — could trigger a conflict with China.
These fears are overblown. I study Chinese military strength and strategy, and I’m convinced that if the United States were to take a more assertive stance in the South China Sea, Beijing would be likely to back down to avoid a war it knows it would lose.
这样的担忧被夸大了。我研究中国的军事实力和战略，我相信，如果美国在南海采取更强硬的立场，北京可能会退缩，从而避免一场他们明知会输的战争。
China may enjoy military advantages in a potential conflict with Taiwan, which is just off the mainland. But its position is less secure in the South China Sea. Over the past 15 years China has built more than two dozen military outposts on disputed islands. Among the largest — at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef — there are air strips, fighter jets, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. But so far China lacks sufficient antiaircraft and anti-ship missile systems in the region to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate, which leaves the Chinese bases vulnerable to air and naval bombardment.
And the South China Sea is vast — about half the size of the continental United States. The Sierra Madre is around 800 miles from the Chinese mainland. A conflict there would require the People’s Liberation Army to mount joint air and naval resupply operations and to refuel its fighters across great distances — something it has never done and is not equipped for.
南海面积巨大，大约是美国大陆面积的一半。马德雷山号距离中国大陆约1300公里。如果在那里发生冲突，中国人民解放军需要开展海空联合补给行动，并跨越很远的距离为战机加油——这是中国从来没有做过的事情，它也没有相应的装备。
If the Philippines is in the fight, treaty obligations would trigger the participation of the United States, which would have access to nine Philippine air and naval bases, greatly enhancing its already considerable ability to project military power in the region. China does have “carrier-killer” ballistic missiles based on its mainland. But U.S. carriers could still send fighters into parts of the South China Sea from outside the range of those missiles. In conjunction with land-based fighters operating from the Philippines, the United States could gain crucial air superiority over a Chinese surface fleet.
如果菲律宾参与战斗，条约义务将引发美国的参与，美国将可以使用菲律宾的九个空军和海军基地，大大增强美国在该地区投射军事力量的能力。中国确实拥有“航母杀手”弹道导弹。但美国航母仍然可以从这些导弹的射程之外派遣战斗机进入南海部分地区，配合从菲律宾地面起飞的战斗机，美国可以获得对中国水面舰队至关重要的空中优势。
China has spent huge sums on its aircraft carrier program and has two in operation, with two more in development. But those still cannot rival the number or capabilities of nuclear-powered U.S. carriers, which are larger, support more aircraft and need to refuel only about every 20 years. China’s carriers need to be refueled about every six days. And learning how to effectively conduct carrier operations takes time; the Chinese have only just begun.
中国在航母项目上投入了巨额资金，目前有两艘航母在役，还有两艘正在研发中。但它们在数量和能力方面仍无法与美国的核动力航母相比。后者更大，可搭载更多飞机，大约每20年才需要补充一次燃料。中国的航母大约每六天就需要补充燃料。学习如何有效开展航母行动需要时间；中国的发展才刚刚开始。
It’s telling that China has been careful to use Coast Guard and civilian vessels in its encounters with neighbors rather than hard military assets — the latter would signal an escalation that Beijing is not yet willing to embark on.
中国在与邻国的冲突中一直小心翼翼地使用海警和民用船只，而不是直接的军事资产，这一点很说明问题——后者意味着局势升级，而北京还不愿意这样。
But there is another very good reason China is unlikely to risk war with the United States: It doesn’t need to. Its brinkmanship and use of nonmilitary assets to intimidate its Asian neighbors has been more than enough to take China from almost no military presence in the South China Sea in the late 2000s to a significant force today.
但中国不太可能冒险与美国开战还有另一个很好的理由：它不需要这样做。它使用边缘政策、利用非军事资产来恐吓其亚洲邻国，这些做法已经足以让中国从本世纪头十年末在南海几乎没有军事存在，发展成今天这样的一股重要力量。
America should call China’s bluff and press its military advantage. This could include escorting Philippine resupply vessels headed to Second Thomas Shoal or even conducting some supply missions itself or with allies like Australia and Japan. This would send China the powerful message that its intimidation will no longer go unchallenged, while allowing Manila to remain visibly in the lead but part of a more enduring coalition. To save face for China, Washington could present operations like these as exercises or training to minimize pressure on Beijing to respond.
美国应该揭穿中国的虚张声势，并施展它的军事优势。这可能包括护送前往仁爱礁的菲律宾补给船，甚至自己或与澳大利亚和日本等盟友一起执行一些补给任务。这将向中国发出一个强有力的信息——中国的恫吓将不再是不受挑战的，同时让马尼拉在保持明显的主导地位的同时，处在更持久的联盟之中。为了给中国留面子，华盛顿的此类行动可以采取演习或训练的形式，尽量减少北京做出回应的压力。
Manila is a strategically vital player in America’s regional competition with China. The United States and the Philippines should strengthen their alliance to allow for more U.S. bases in the Philippines and a stronger U.S. commitment to help defend against Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Closer relations could also make it easier for the United States to resupply Taiwan from Philippine bases during a conflict with China and open the door for enhanced military cooperation with other South China Sea nations, whose fear of an unrestrained Beijing may be deterring them from taking that step. If China determines that its provocations are likely to draw in the United States, it might begin to moderate its behavior.
在美国与中国的地区竞争中，马尼拉是一个至关重要的战略角色。美国和菲律宾应该加强联盟，令美国在菲律宾拥有更多基地，美国应加强承诺，帮助菲律宾抵御中国对其水域的侵犯。更紧密的关系还可以令美国在与中国发生冲突时，更容易从菲律宾基地向台湾提供补给，并为与其他南海国家加强军事合作打开大门——对中国的肆意妄为的畏惧导致它们不愿意走出这一步。如果中国确定其挑衅行为可能会引来美国，它可能会开始缓和自己的行为。
Of course, anything is possible — Beijing may respond with a full-on military escalation, a daunting prospect that should not be taken lightly. But that risk is low for a Chinese military whose own doctrine is to avoid any war in which victory is not ensured.
当然，一切皆有可能——北京可能会以全面的军事升级作为回应，这种令人生畏的前景不容轻视。但是这种风险并不高，因为中国军队的准则是避免任何无法确保胜利的战争。
Neither U.S. option — standing up to China or backing down — is attractive. But unless the United States asserts itself, China will continue chipping away with its tactics of bluster and intimidation until its military presence in the South China Sea becomes so dominant that it no longer fears war.
对美国来说，无论对抗中国还是做出退让都并非理想的选择。但是，除非美国坚持自己的立场，中国将继续采取虚张声势和恐吓的策略，直到其在南海的军事存在变得极为强大，达到不再害怕战争的程度。
The United States can re-establish a favorable balance of power, but it must act now.
美国可以重新建立一种有利的力量平衡，但它必须现在就采取行动。