纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英产能过剩价格大跌中国太阳能产业陷入动荡

Over the past 15 years, China has come to dominate the global market for solar energy. Nearly every solar panel on the planet is made by a Chinese company. Even the equipment to manufacture solar panels is made almost entirely in China. The country’s solar panel exports, measured by how much power they can produce, jumped another 10 percent in May over last year.

在过去15年里，中国主导了全球太阳能市场。地球上几乎所有的太阳能电池板都是由中国公司制造的。就连生产太阳能电池板的设备也几乎全部在中国制造。根据产生的电力来衡量，今年5月中国的太阳能电池板的出口较去年又增长了10%。

But China’s solar panel domestic industry is in upheaval.

但中国太阳能电池板的国内产业正在经历动荡。

Wholesale prices plummeted by almost half last year and have fallen another 25 percent this year. Chinese manufacturers are competing for customers by cutting prices far below their costs, and still keep building more factories.

批发价格去年下降了近一半，今年又下跌了25%。中国制造商正以远低于成本的价格争夺客户，同时仍在继续建造更多的工厂。

The price slashing has taken a severe toll on China’s solar companies. Stock prices of its five biggest makers of panels and other equipment have halved in the past 12 months. Since late June, at least seven large Chinese manufacturers have warned that they will announce heavy losses for the first half of this year.

降价对中国太阳能企业造成了严重打击。过去12个月，中国五大电池板及其他设备制造商的股价下跌了一半。自6月下旬以来，至少有七家中国大型制造商警告，它们将宣布今年上半年出现严重亏损。

The turmoil in the solar energy sector amid enormous factory capacity and booming exports highlights how China’s industrial policymaking works. The government decided 15 years ago to put extensive support behind solar power, and then let the companies claw it out. Beijing has shown a high tolerance for letting firms stumble and even fail in large numbers.

在工厂产能巨大、出口蓬勃发展的背景下，太阳能行业的动荡凸显出中国产业决策的运作方式。15年前，中国政府决定大力支持太阳能发电，然后放手让企业自生自灭。对于任凭大量企业遭遇困难甚至倒闭，政府表现出了很高的容忍度。

Something similar is happening in the automotive sector. Annual car sales in China are around 25 million a year, more than any other country but barely half the country’s ability to make vehicles. So automakers in China are now following the solar industry’s lead in cutting prices sharply and ramping up exports.

类似的情形也发生在汽车行业。中国每年的汽车销量约为2500万辆，比任何国家都要多，但这还不到中国汽车制造能力的一半。因此，中国的汽车制造商正在跟随太阳能行业的脚步，大幅降价，增加出口。

China’s approach can lead to big financial losses for local governments, state investment funds and state-supported banks, all of which bankroll companies in favored industries.

中国的做法可能会给地方政府、国家投资基金和国家支持的银行带来巨大的财务损失，这些机构都为受青睐行业的公司提供资金。

“It’s a very expensive development model, but it produces national champions quite reliably,” said David R. Hoffman, a senior adviser on China for the Conference Board, a global business group.

“这是一种非常昂贵的发展模式，但它却能可靠地培养出国家级的龙头企业，”全球商业组织世界大型企业联合会的中国问题高级顾问戴维·霍夫曼说。

Beijing’s spare-no-expense policies are in particular focus as China doubles down on factory exports to compensate for a slowing domestic economy — drawing criticism from the United States, the European Union and other trading partners who contend that China’s heavy support of its industries is unfair.

在中国加大出口力度以弥补国内疲软的经济之际，北京不惜代价的政策尤其受到关注，这招致了美国、欧盟和其他贸易伙伴的批评，他们认为中国对一些产业的大力支持是不公平的。

China’s Communist Party leadership called on Sunday for further investment in high-tech industries, including solar power. In his speech last week at the Republican National Convention, former President Donald J. Trump called for an end to the Biden administration’s renewable energy programs, which he labeled a “green new scam.”

上周日，中共领导层呼吁进一步投资包括太阳能在内的高科技产业。上周在共和党全国代表大会上发表演讲时，前总统特朗普呼吁结束拜登政府的可再生能源计划，称其为“绿色新骗局”。

The rise and fall of Hunan Sunzone Optoelectronics in Changsha, the capital of Hunan Province in south-central China, is a case study of how China’s policies work.

在中南部省份湖南，位于其省会长沙的湖南神州光电能源有限公司的兴衰可以作为中国政策发挥作用的案例。

Started in 2008, the solar panel manufacturer benefited early on from practically every possible subsidy. It got 22 acres of prime downtown land in the heart of the city almost for free. One of China’s biggest state-owned banks arranged a loan at a low interest rate. The Hunan provincial government then agreed to pay most of the interest.

这家太阳能电池板制造商于2008年成立，从一开始就享受到了各种可能的补贴。它几乎免费获得了约130亩位于市中心黄金地段的地皮。中国最大的国有银行之一安排了低息贷款。湖南省政府随后同意承担大部分利息。

Despite the financial help, Sunzone’s factory now sits empty. A large “Sunzone” sign on the second floor rusts in the swampy heat of Changsha. The only person still working at the site on a recent afternoon, a security guard, said that manufacturing equipment was removed in January and the factory was set to be demolished and turned into office buildings.

尽管得到了财政支持，如今，神州光电的工厂空无一人。在长沙极其闷热天气里，二楼一个巨大的“神州”标志锈迹斑斑。不久前的一个下午，唯一还在厂区工作的人是一名保安，他说生产设备已于1月搬走，工厂计划拆除，改造成办公楼。

Sunzone epitomizes how lavish lending from state-owned banks and generous local subsidies have produced manufacturing overcapacity. Solar companies cut costs and prices sharply to maintain market share. That led to a few low-cost survivors while many other competitors were driven out of business in China and around the world.

神州光电是国有银行大量放贷、地方政府慷慨补贴导致制造业产能过剩的缩影。太阳能公司大幅削减成本和降价来维持市场份额。这使得一些低成本企业得以幸存，而许多竞争对手则在海内外市场销声匿迹。

China’s banks, acting at Beijing’s direction, have lent so much money to the sector for factory construction that the country’s solar factory capacity is roughly double the entire world’s demand.

在北京的示意下，银行向太阳能行业发放了大量贷款，用于工厂建设，以至于全国的太阳能工厂产能大约是全球需求的两倍。

Sunzone’s 360-employee factory was big when it was built. Within a few years, rivals elsewhere in China were building much larger factories.

神州光电的工厂拥有360名员工，在建成时规模很大。在短短的几年时间里，中国其他地方的竞争对手都在建造规模大得多的工厂。

Sunzone’s rivals, including Tongwei and Longi Green Energy Technology, gained formidable economies from large-scale production. They have plowed part of their extra revenue into developing solar panels that are increasingly efficient at converting sunlight into electricity.

神州的竞争对手——包括通威和隆基绿能——都通过大规模生产获得了可观的经济效益。他们将部分额外收入投入到太阳能电池板的研发，提高将阳光转化为电能的效率。

Many other factories, like Sunzone’s, quickly become obsolete.

许多工厂，比如神州的工厂，很快就遭到淘汰。

“Enterprises continue to put advanced production capacity into operation to maintain competitiveness” said Zhang Jianhua, director of China’s National Energy Administration, at a news conference last month. “At the same time, the outdated production capacity is still extensive and needs to be gradually phased out.”

中国国家能源局局长章建华在上月的新闻发布会上表示：“企业不断投产先进产能以维持整个市场竞争力，与此同时旧有产能仍有较大规模，需要逐步退出市场。”

Solar manufacturers across China have been laying off thousands of workers to cut costs — and those workers may be the lucky ones because they qualify for months of severance pay. Other big solar companies have resorted to tactics like giving yearlong unpaid vacations or 30 percent pay cuts for employees who keep their jobs.

为了削减成本，中国各地的太阳能制造商裁掉了数以千计的工人——这些工人可能算是幸运的，因为他们能拿到相当于数月工资的遣散费。还有些大型太阳能公司采取了其他策略，比如给员工一年的无薪假期，或者给留下来工作的员工减薪30%。

Yet some companies say that they are furloughing workers only in preparation for even bigger production pushes in the future. “We’re saying, ‘Go back to your farm and help with the harvest, and come back in the autumn when the new equipment is ready,’ ” said Zhang Haimeng, group vice president of Longi.

然而，一些公司表示，他们让员工休假只是在为未来更大规模的生产做准备。隆基绿能副总裁张海濛说：“我们说，‘回村里帮忙收割，秋天新设备准备好了再回来。’”

Compounding the problems facing China’s solar energy companies is the rapid disappearance of local subsidies. Local governments are running out of money as a housing crisis makes it hard for them to sell long-term leases on state land to real estate developers — previously their biggest source of cash.

地方补贴的迅速消失加剧了中国太阳能企业面临的难题。由于房地产危机，地方政府难以将国有土地的长期租约出售给开发商，而这曾是地方政府最大的资金来源，地方政府的财务状况正在见底。

“They don’t have the money to support anything,” said Ocean Yuan, the chief executive of Grape Solar, a large distributor of solar panels.

“他们没有资金做任何事情，”大型太阳能电池板分销商Grape Solar的首席执行官袁海洋说。

China’s leaders are becoming concerned. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issued a draft rule this month that solar companies can borrow only 70 percent of the money to build or expand factories, not the previous 80 percent. Still, the change was too small to reduce China’s overcapacity, according to Frank Haugwitz, a solar industry consultant.

中国领导人开始感到担忧。工业和信息化部本月发布了一项草案，要求太阳能企业在新建或扩建工厂时只能获得70%的贷款，而之前是80%。尽管如此，太阳能行业顾问弗兰克·豪格维茨表示，这一变化太小，不足以减少中国的产能过剩。

The West is raising barriers to China’s solar panels. Europe has begun barring their use in government procurement projects unless Chinese companies disclose their subsidies, which they refuse to do.

西方正在提高对中国太阳能电池板的壁垒。欧洲已开始禁止在政府采购项目中使用中国太阳能电池板，除非中国公司披露其补贴情况，而中国企业拒绝这么做。

Partly because of worries about Chinese subsidies, President Biden last month allowed steep tariffs that had expired to go back into force on solar products imported from Southeast Asia that use lots of Chinese components. And the Department of Commerce has begun trade cases against imported solar panels that could lead to further tariffs.

在一定程度上出于对中国补贴的担忧，拜登总统上个月允许对从东南亚进口的太阳能产品重新征收已经到期的高额关税，这些产品使用了大量中国零部件。商务部已经开始针对进口太阳能电池板提起贸易诉讼，这可能导致进一步的关税。

But China’s solar panel manufacturers are resilient. Some of the largest have restarted operations, often with the help of banks and local governments, after collapsing a decade ago.

但中国的太阳能电池板制造商很顽强。一些规模最大的企业在十年前倒闭后往往在银行和地方政府的帮助下重新开始运营。

Zhao Feng, the founder of Sunzone in Changsha, said he hoped that his company might also recover. A Sunzone shareholder filed a lawsuit in a Hunan court in 2018 to force the company into insolvency following losses, but later withdrew it. Mr. Zhao, who is now in the United States, said that he wanted to refocus the company on artificial intelligence and electric cars, the latest favorites of Chinese industrial policy.

长沙神州光电的创始人赵枫表示，他希望自己的公司也能复苏。2018年，神州的一名股东曾在湖南一家法院提起诉讼，要求该公司在亏损后破产，但后来撤回了诉讼。目前在美国的赵枫说，他想把公司的重点重新放在人工智能和电动汽车上，这是中国产业政策的最新宠儿。

“When we want to develop,” he said, “we will ask banks and the government for support.”

“我们要发展的时候，”他说，“我们会要银行、要政府给予支持。”