纽约时报中文网 - 中英对照版-中英在中国的后院美国放低姿态加强与盟友合作

Far from Ukraine and Gaza, as the Group of 7 wealthy democracies gathers in Italy to discuss a range of old, entrenched challenges, the nature of American power is being transformed across the region that Washington sees as crucial for the century to come: the Asia-Pacific.

在远离乌克兰和加沙的地方，当富裕民主国家组成的七国集团齐聚意大利讨论一系列积重难返、根深蒂固的挑战时，美国力量的性质正在亚太地区发生转变，在华盛顿眼里，该地区对未来世纪至关重要。

Here, America no longer presents itself as the confident guarantor of security, a trust-us-we’ve-got-this superpower. The terrain is too vast, China’s rise too great a threat. So the United States has been offering to be something else — an eager teammate for military modernization and tech development.

在这个地区，美国不再是自信的安全保障者，不再是“相信我们，我们有办法”的超级大国。这里太过辽阔，中国的崛起是一个太过巨大的威胁。因此，美国提出扮演另一种角色——军事现代化和技术发展的热心队友。

“In the past, our experts would talk about a hub-and-spokes model for Indo-Pacific security,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III said this month at a global defense conference in Singapore. “Today we’re seeing something quite different.”

“过去，我们的专家会谈论印太地区安全的轴辐式模式，”国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀本月在新加坡举行的全球防务会议上说。“今天，我们看到了截然不同的情况。”

In this new era, many countries are doing more, on their own and with U.S. help. For the first time, the United States is building nuclear-propelled submarines with Australia; involving South Korea in nuclear weapons planning; producing fighter jet engines with India; sharing maritime surveillance duties with small Pacific islands; and working with Japan on adding an offensive strike capability.

在这个新时代，许多国家正在做更多的事情，无论是独自行使还是在美国的帮助下。美国首次与澳大利亚合作建造核动力潜艇；邀请韩国参与核武器规划；与印度合作生产战斗机发动机；与一些小的太平洋岛国分担海上监视任务；与日本合作增加进攻打击能力。

Behind the scenes, U.S. officials are also testing new secure communications systems with their partners. They’re signing deals to co-produce artillery with allies and to secure blood supplies from hospitals around the region in case of a conflict. They are also training with many more nations in more expansive ways.

在幕后，美国官员还在与合作伙伴测试新的安全通信系统。他们正在签署协议，与盟友共同生产火炮，并确保在发生冲突时能从该地区各处的医院获取血液供应。他们还在以更广泛的方式与更多国家进行训练。

These collaborations highlight how the region sees China. Many countries fear Beijing’s growing military strength and belligerence — its threats against the democratic island of Taiwan, its claim to most of the South China Sea and its land grab at the border with India. They are also less sure about China as an economic partner, with the slowing pace of its post-Covid economy and tilt away from pro-growth, pro-entrepreneur policies under Xi Jinping.

这些合作凸显了该地区对中国的看法。许多国家担心北京不断增长的军事实力和好战行为，包括对民主岛屿台湾的威胁、对南中国海大部分海域的主权要求，以及在与印度交界处抢夺领土。随着中国在后疫情时期经济发展速度放缓，加上习近平上台后偏离支持增长、支持商业的政策，他们对中国作为经济伙伴的信心也大打折扣。

But are the countries linking arms with the United States making a long-term bet on America over China? Or are they recognizing their own rising strength and behaving like pragmatists, getting what they can from a fitful superpower where an increasing number of voters want the country to stay out of world affairs?

但是，那些与美国携手的国家，真的是把长期赌注放在美国而非中国身上吗？还是它们认识到了自身实力的不断增强，并表现得像实用主义者一样，从一个有越来越多的选民希望远离世界事务的不稳定超级大国那里获得它们能得到的东西？

In interviews with more than 100 current and former officials from the United States and countries across the Indo-Pacific over the past year, many said that the next century was likely to be less dominated by America than the last. No matter who wins the next election or the one after that, they said, the nation responsible for today’s world order has been weakened by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the destabilizing effects of China’s rise on domestic manufacturing and America’s own internal divisions.

过去一年里，美国和印太地区国家的100多名现任和前任官员接受了采访，其中许多人表示，下个世纪美国的主导地位很可能不如上个世纪。他们说，无论谁赢得下届或以后的选举，这个肩负着维持当今世界秩序的国家已经被伊拉克战争和阿富汗战争、中国崛起对其国内制造业的破坏性影响，以及美国的内部分裂所削弱。

The world is changing, too, with more nations strong enough to shape events. And as the United States shares sensitive technology and prioritizes teamwork, many believe they are witnessing both a global reshuffling and an evolution in American power.

世界也在发生变化，越来越多的国家拥有了足以左右事态发展的能力。随着美国分享敏感技术并优先考虑团队合作，许多人认为他们正在目睹全球重新洗牌和美国实力的演变。

For now, they argue, the United States is adapting to a more multipolar world. It is learning to cooperate in ways that many Washington politicians, fixated on American supremacy, do not discuss — with an admission of greater need and more humility.

他们认为，目前，美国正在适应一个更加多极化的世界。美国正在学习以许多固守美国霸主地位的华盛顿政客不曾讨论过的方式进行合作，并承认美国有更大的需求，行事需要更加谦和。

America Diminished

衰落的美国

The United States does not tower over the world like it used to.

美国不再像过去那样高高在上。

Since World War II, the U.S. share of the global economy has been cut in half. That is mostly because of Asia’s steady economic rise. China alone produces around 35 percent of the world’s manufactured goods, three times the share of the United States. Japan, India and South Korea have also joined the top seven in terms of output, giving Asia more industrial heft than any other part of the world.

自第二次世界大战以来，美国在全球经济中的份额已经减少了一半。这主要是因为亚洲经济的稳步崛起。仅中国就生产了全球约35%的制成品，是美国的三倍。日本、印度和韩国也加入了产量排名前七位的行列，使亚洲的工业实力超过了世界上其他地区。

America’s military superiority has been better maintained, but China, with a smaller budget and sharper focus on the Indo-Pacific, now has a larger navy by number of ships, a likely lead in hypersonic weapons and many more factories to expand military production if needed.

美国的军事优势得到了更好的保持，但预算较少、更专注于印太地区的中国现在拥有更多的海军舰船，在高超音速武器方面可能处于领先地位，而且有更多的工厂可以在必要时扩大军工生产。

American democracy is also not what it once was, as measured merely by the declining number of bills that presidents have signed into law. The Republican Party has repeatedly held up budgets, drawing the president back from trips overseas, in addition to delaying aid for partners like Ukraine and Taiwan. Recent polls show that most Republicans want the United States to take a less active role in solving the world’s problems.

仅从总统签署成为法律的法案数量不断减少来看，美国民主也已今非昔比。共和党一再拖延预算，让总统不得不放弃海外行程，此外还拖延对乌克兰和台湾等伙伴的援助。最近的民调显示，大多数共和党人希望美国在解决世界问题时不要扮演那么积极的角色。

Yet both parties have struggled with how to tackle and talk about Asia’s shifting power dynamics and America’s limits.

然而，两党都苦于如何应对和讨论亚洲不断变化的实力态势，以及美国的局限性。

“It goes back several administrations,” said James L. Jones, a retired Marine Corps general who served as national security adviser under President Barack Obama. “We’ve had a fairly long period of time where the United States has sent conflicting messages.”

“这可以追溯到几届政府之前，”曾在奥巴马总统时期担任国家安全顾问的退役海军陆战队将军詹姆斯·琼斯说。“在相当长的一段时间里，美国发出了相互矛盾的信息。”

The Obama administration promised a “pivot to Asia” that seemed to never come. The Trump administration’s foreign policy — with its mix of anti-China diatribes and abandonment of a major trans-Pacific free-trade deal — was seen by some countries as a sign of U.S. insecurity about the challenge from Beijing.

奥巴马政府承诺的“重返亚洲”似乎从未实现。特朗普政府的外交政策中夹杂着反华抨击，并放弃了一项重要的跨太平洋自由贸易协定，这在一些国家看来是美国对来自北京的挑战感到不安的表现。

China had already become an economic colossus, the most important trade partner for most nations in the Indo-Pacific, and a major investor.

中国已经成为一个经济巨人，是印太地区大多数国家最重要的贸易伙伴和主要投资国。

Countries across the region have also spent the past few decades producing millions of new middle-class consumers and expanding sophisticated industrial production, fueling a surge of regional trade that made the U.S. market less important while allowing more Asian nations to build tighter bonds.

过去几十年来，该地区各国还出现了数以百万计的新中产阶级消费者，扩大了先进的工业生产，推动了地区贸易的激增，使美国市场的重要性下降，同时让更多亚洲国家建立了更紧密的联系。

Both confidence and anxiety have emerged from these broader trends. Military budgets across Asia have soared in recent years, and the demand for American defense technology has never been higher.

这些更广泛的趋势中催生了信心和焦虑。近年来，亚洲各国的军事预算激增，对美国国防技术的需求也空前高涨。

Yet many countries in the region now see themselves as players in an emerging multipolar order. “We are the main characters in our collective story,” President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. of the Philippines said during a keynote speech at the conference in Singapore. And as a result, they have turned to the United States less as a protector than a provider of goods (weapons), services (training) and investment (in new technology and equipment maintenance).

然而，该地区许多国家现在认为自己是一个新兴多极秩序的参与者。菲律宾总统费迪南德·马科斯在新加坡会议上发表主旨演讲时说：“在我们的这个集体故事中，我们是主角。”因此，当他们向美国求助时，与其说美国是保护者，不如说是商品（武器）、服务（培训）和投资（新技术和设备维护）的提供者。

Japan has made the sharpest turn. From easing tensions with South Korea to pulling back from decades of pacifism with plans to sharply increase its military budget, to signing troop movement agreements with Australia and other countries, Tokyo has made clear that it now seeks a leading role in protecting regional stability. But even as Washington welcomes the move, Tokyo’s actions grow in part from a critical assessment of the United States.

日本的转变最为明显。从缓和与韩国的紧张关系，到从数十年的和平主义中抽身，计划大幅增加军事预算，再到与澳大利亚和其他国家签署部队调动协议，东京已表明，它现在寻求在维护地区稳定方面发挥主导作用。但即使华盛顿对东京的举动表示欢迎，东京的行动也部分源于对美国的批判性评估。

During a joint exercise with the American Air Force in Guam last year, Japanese commanders said they were expecting to become more active because Japan’s neighbors wanted Japan to do more, implying broad recognition that America’s future role was uncertain.

去年在关岛与美国空军举行联合演习时，日本指挥官表示，他们希望变得更加积极，因为日本的邻国希望日本做得更多，这意味着人们普遍认识到美国未来的角色充满不确定性。

“The United States is no more what it used to be 20 years ago, 30 years ago,” said a senior Japanese intelligence official, who spoke on a condition of anonymity to avoid offending his American counterparts. “That’s the fact of the matter.”

“美国已经不再是20年前、30年前的美国了，”一位不愿透露姓名、以免冒犯美国官员的日本高级情报官员说。“这是事实。”

“No matter who the next president is,” he added, “the role of the United States will be relatively diminished.”

他还说，“无论下一任总统是谁，美国的作用都将相对减弱。”

America Adjusting

美国的调整

American officials are aware of the world’s doubts. When told that some counterparts in Asia saw humility in the American response, a handful of Washington officials winced, as if lemon juice had been squeezed into their eyes. It sounded too much like weakness.

美国官员意识到了世界的疑虑。当得知一些亚洲官员从美国的反应中看到谦和时，华盛顿的一些官员不禁皱起了眉头，仿佛眼睛里进了柠檬汁。这听起来太像软弱了。

But some Pentagon leaders have been open about seeking what analysts describe as “co-everything” with partners — co-development, co-production, co-sustainment. And while U.S. officials have talked for decades about alliances in Asia, their tone and actions over the past few years point to a subtle shift, toward a more decentralized approach to security and greater candor about their concerns.

但是，五角大楼的一些领导人已经公开表示要寻求与合作伙伴“共同分担一切”——共同开发、共同生产、共同维护。虽然美国官员几十年来一直在谈论在亚洲结盟的问题，但他们在过去几年中的语气和行动表现出了微妙的转变，即在安全问题上采取更加分散的方法，并更加坦率地表达他们的担忧。

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken delivered a speech in September that called for greater humility in foreign policy to face “challenges that no one country can address alone.”

国务卿布林肯在去年9月发表讲话，呼吁外交政策要更加谦和，以应对“任何一个国家都无法单独应对的挑战”。

Gen. David H. Berger, the Marine Corps’ top general until he retired last year, launched a sweeping plan in 2019 to counter China’s strengths by redistributing American forces in Asia, shifting to smaller units that are now more mobile, with access to bases in many countries.

海军陆战队最高将领戴维·伯杰将军在去年退休前，于2019年提出了一项全面计划，通过重新分配美军在亚洲的兵力来对抗中国的优势，将美军转向规模较小的部队，这些部队现在更加机动灵活，可以进入许多国家的基地。

In Singapore, a senior defense official said the formula involves more capable nations, investing in themselves, in partnerships across the region, and in working with the United States, which now accepts that it need not be at the center of every relationship.

在新加坡，一位高级国防官员表示，这个方案涉及实力更强的国家加强自身投资、展开跨区域合作，并与现在接受自己不必在每段关系中居于中心位置的美国合作。

Hints of that humbler America can be seen in large, multinational military exercises, where other countries are playing bigger roles, and in smaller projects, such as a Pacific Fusion Center that opened last year in the Pacific island nation of Vanuatu. A data hub for maritime analysis of threats ranging from illegal fishing to Chinese encroachment, it had started out as more of a U.S. operation until local partners demanded a role and American officials backed down and brought them in.

目前在大型多国军事演习和小型项目中，可以看到美国放低身段的端倪，前一种是让其他国家发挥更大的作用，后者的例子包括去年在太平洋岛国瓦努阿图成立的太平洋融合中心。该中心是对从非法捕鱼到中国侵占等各种威胁进行海上分析的数据中心，它一开始更多算是美国的行动，直到当地合作伙伴要求发挥作用，美国官员便退让并让他们参与进来。

India offers a more layered portrait of America’s evolution, pointing to sustained U.S. interest in long-term, comprehensive plans for working closely with an increasingly confident New Delhi — even if that means quieting down concerns about its democratic backsliding.

透过美印关系，可以看到美国嬗变更为丰富的层次。美国一直有兴趣通过长期、全面的计划与日益自信的新德里紧密合作，即使这意味着要压低对印度民主倒退的担忧。

In interviews, some Indian officials said that a turning point arrived when the Americans pulled out troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, leaving behind scenes of stunning chaos that suggested more input from the region would have been useful.

一些印度官员在接受采访时表示，一个转折点是2021年8月，美国从阿富汗撤军时留下了令人震惊的混乱场面，这表明该地区的更多参与可能会有所帮助。

“The U.S. did very little consultation in the run-up to withdrawal, and started doing much more after that,” one senior Indian diplomat said.

一位印度高级外交官表示：“美国在撤军前几乎没做什么磋商，撤军后则开始做得更多。”

In meetings at the United States Embassy in India’s capital, against a backdrop of congressional hearings on the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol, American officials softened and talked more about shared shades of gray in their democracies. Diplomats from both countries said concerns about the Indian government’s promotion of Hindu nationalism or suppression of dissent were sanded down to: “We have a lot of commonalities — extremism, hate speech, disinformation. How are you dealing with it?”

在美国驻新德里大使馆举行的会议上，在国会就1月6日国会大厦袭击事件举行听证会的背景下，美国官员的态度有所缓和，更多地谈到了两国民主制度中的共同之处。两国外交官表示，对印度政府宣扬印度教民族主义或压制异见的担忧已经淡化为：“我们面临着很多共同的问题——极端主义、仇恨言论、虚假信息。你们那边是怎么处理的？”

Along with a change in how American officials talked about their own country came a broadening of how they saw India: not just as a huge market, with the world’s largest population, but also a multiplier for innovation.

随着美国官员谈论自己国家的方式发生变化，他们对印度的认识也在不断扩大：印度不仅是一个拥有世界上最多人口的巨大市场，还是创新的倍增器。

India graduates more than 1.4 million engineers each year, on par with China. At a time when the United States has become worried about Chinese advances in electric vehicles, missiles, quantum computing and other technologies, India could offer a pool of talent to help keep up.

印度每年培养的工程师超过140万人，与中国不相上下。当美国开始担心中国在电动汽车、导弹、量子计算和其他技术方面的进步时，印度可以提供一个人才库，帮助美国跟上中国的步伐。

It all came together in a strategic defense and technology-focused agreement unveiled during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington in 2023.

在2023年印度总理莫迪对华盛顿进行国事访问期间，双方达成了一项以战略防御和技术为重点的协议。

New Delhi was most excited about the co-production of fighter jet engines, which it had been seeking for years. But the White House emphasized in its own announcement that with shared investment in everything from nuclear energy to microchips, “no corner of human enterprise is untouched” by a partnership that spans “the seas to the stars.”

最令新德里兴奋的是联合生产战斗机发动机，这是它多年来一直在寻求的技术。但白宫则在声明中强调，两国共同投资从核能到微芯片等所有领域，这种“从海洋到星际”的合作关系“会触及人类事业的方方面面”。

Pushed by other countries, the United States may finally be learning that a humbler approach can yield powerful results, said Ryan Crocker, a retired diplomat who served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Kuwait and Lebanon.

曾任美国驻阿富汗、伊拉克、巴基斯坦、叙利亚、科威特和黎巴嫩大使的退休外交官瑞安·克罗克表示，在其他国家的推动下，美国可能终于懂得了谦逊的态度可以产生巨大的效果。

“A certain degree of humility does not mean weakness,” he said. “We can’t do it all, we shouldn’t do it all. We have these relations and alliances, let’s figure out who does what.”

“一定程度的谦和并不意味着软弱，”他说。“我们做不到面面俱到，也不应该大包大揽。我们有这些关系和联盟，让我们弄清楚什么该由谁来做。”

The Risks of American Actions

美国行动的风险

In conversations about America with defense leaders from the Philippines, Japan, India, Australia and other countries, there is often a hint of happy customers reviewing a bazaar.

在与菲律宾、日本、印度、澳大利亚和其他国家的国防领导人谈论美国时，经常会有一种在听顾客高高兴兴逛集市的感觉。

The United States under President Biden has been selling and giving out quite a lot. Tomahawk missiles for Japan. Coast Guard boats for Vietnam. Improved runways for the strategically located island nation of Palau. Training for seemingly everyone in Asia who asks.

在拜登总统的领导下，美国一直在大力销售和提供援助。它提供战斧导弹给日本。提供海岸警卫队船只给越南。为地理位置优越的岛国帕劳改进跑道。为亚洲似乎每个提出要求的一方提供培训。

Is there danger in all that generosity?

这些慷慨大方是否会存在危险？

Some analysts fear that America’s effort to spread its wares across a more fragmented world adds to the sensitive touch points for brinkmanship with China, raising the risk of a misunderstanding that could become a conflict.

一些分析人士担心，美国试图将这些物品传播到一个愈发分崩离析的世界，增加了与中国边缘政策的敏感触点，使得误解升级为冲突的风险大增。

“Washington’s pursuit of an increasingly complex lattice of security ties is a dangerous game,” wrote Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael D. Swaine, two defense researchers in Washington, in a recent essay for The New York Times.

华盛顿的两位国防研究人员麦克·M·迈克尔·D·斯温在最近为《纽约时报》撰写的一篇文章中写道：“华盛顿追求日益复杂的安全关系网是一场危险的游戏。”

Clearly, Beijing is not happy about the growth of U.S. partnerships.

显然，北京对美国伙伴关系的增长不高兴。

At the Singapore conference in early June, China’s defense minister, Dong Jun, railed against what he described as “exclusive military alliances” that he said “cannot make our region safer.”

在6月初举行的新加坡会议上，中国国防部长董军抨击了其所谓的“排他性军事同盟”，称其“无法让我们的地区更安全”。

But if one risk of America’s collective approach involves doing too much, possibly sparking a confrontation, another could involve the U.S. failing to lock in enough from its partners.

但是，如果说美国的这种结盟之道存在着做得太多的风险，可能引发冲突，那么另一个风险可能就是美国未能从其合作伙伴那里获得足够的支持。

There is a lot of ambiguity in the coalitions that increasingly define American power in Asia. How would the region respond if the Philippines stumbled toward a violent clash in the South China Sea? Or in a war over Taiwan — a center of the global chip business that China sees as its own lost territory — would the countries co-developing military equipment with the United States, or welcoming longer runways, actually spring into action?

美国在亚洲的实力越来越由各种联盟所定义，而这些联盟中存在着许多模糊之处。如果菲律宾在南海不小心陷入暴力冲突，该地区将如何应对？或者，如果发生围绕台湾的战争——台湾是全球芯片业务的中心，中国认为台湾是自己的失地——与美国共同开发军事装备或欢迎延长跑道的国家会真的立刻采取行动吗？

It is also not clear how Washington itself would respond to Chinese aggression. And that uncertainty, according to many, is what countries are desperate to understand as they pull America closer.

目前还不清楚华盛顿本身将如何应对中国的进犯行为。许多人认为，这种不确定性正是各国在与美国拉近关系时迫切想要了解的。

“In the over 40 years I’ve known the United States, I’ve seen you go through troughs of being overly self-critical and waves of hubris,” said Bilahari Kausikan, one of Singapore’s most experienced diplomats. “One should not make the mistake of believing either is a permanent condition.”

“在我对美国有所了解的40多年里，我见证了美国经历过度自我批评的低谷和一波波的狂妄自大，”新加坡最有经验的外交官之一比拉哈里·考西坎说道。“人们不应该错误地认为这两种情况中的任何一个都是永久的。”

The challenge for Asia and the world, he added, is that America is increasingly dysfunctional and “still indispensable”: No other country does as much to protect the order that other nations and economies need.

他补充说，亚洲和世界面临的挑战是，美国越日益陷入功能障碍，但“仍然不可或缺”：没有哪个国家像美国一样为维护其他国家和经济体所需的秩序付出了如此多的努力。

What’s changed is that a growing number of U.S. officials now acknowledge that more assistance is needed, from more than just familiar allies. In a time of disorienting challenges — Gaza, Ukraine, China, North Korea, pandemics, climate change, artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons — their jobs now involve convincing others that humility can be as American as confidence and that it’s built into a strategy that will last, no matter who is president.

不同以往的是，越来越多的美国官员现在承认需要更多的援助，而不仅仅是来自熟悉的盟友。在这个充满令人困惑的挑战的时代——加沙、乌克兰、中国、朝鲜、流行病、气候变化、人工智能、核武器——他们的工作现在包括让其他人相信，谦和可以像自信一样成为美国的特征，而且谦和是一种无论谁当总统都会持续下去的战略。

When Adm. John Aquilino, in his final days as the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, was asked what his typical day looked like during an event in Australia in April, he didn’t mention aircraft carriers, just allies.

今年4月，在澳大利亚举行的一次活动中，海军上将约翰·阿奎利诺当时在美国印度太平洋司令部司令的任上还有最后几日，当被问及他平日里一天的工作是什么样时，他没有提到航空母舰，只提到了盟友。

“I spend a lot of time either on the phone, on email or on an airplane out to visit my partners,” he said.

“我的大量时间要么花在打电话、发电子邮件上，要么花在乘飞机去拜访我的合作伙伴上，”他说。

Many of his counterparts in the region, he added, have each other’s numbers on speed dial.

他补充说，他与该地区的许多官员都能迅速联系到彼此。