纽约时报中文网 - 英文原版-英The US Has Received a Rare Invitation From China There Is Only One Right Answer
April 18, 2024 3 min 430 words
《纽约时报》的这篇报道主要内容是:美国收到中国参加联合军事演习的邀请,但美国应该拒绝,因为中国可能利用这次机会收集情报,并且参加演习会向中国发出美国软弱的信号,对美国的盟友也是一种背叛。 评论:该报道存在明显偏见,对中国充满不信任,完全是从美国利益的角度出发,而且观点片面武断。参加军事演习是两国军队交流增进互信的一种方式,中国邀请美国参加演习,体现了中国开放合作的态度。美国如果参加,可以增进中美两军相互了解,减少误判,对维护地区稳定有积极意义。报道中提到中国可能利用演习收集情报美国可能显得软弱等,都是毫无根据的猜测和臆断。此外,报道完全忽视了中国在其他领域对美国的开放和合作,例如中国近年来多次举办国际进口博览会,展现了中国扩大开放的决心和信心,得到了国际社会的广泛好评。
In the middle of the last century, as the United States and Russia rapidly amassed thousands of nuclear weapons, China stayed out of the arms race, focusing its energy on growing its economy and broadening its regional influence.
Beijing did build hundreds of nuclear weapons during those years, but the nation’s leaders insisted their modest arsenal was merely for self-defense. Since China’s first nuclear weapons test, in 1964, the country has pledged loudly to never go first in a nuclear conflict — no matter what. That stance, coupled with a stated strategy of “minimum” deterrence, didn’t demand the level of American fear, loathing and attention that the Russian threat did.
Now there is increasing unease in Washington about China’s nuclear ambitions. The Pentagon says Beijing is on track to double the number of its nuclear warheads by the decade’s end, to 1,000 from 500 — a development that senior U.S. officials have publicly called “unprecedented” and “breathtaking.” China has drastically expanded its nuclear testing facility and continued work on three new missile fields in the country’s north, where more than 300 intercontinental ballistic missile silos have recently been constructed.
China’s transformation from a small nuclear power into an far larger one is a historic shift, upending the delicate two-peer balance of the world’s nuclear weapons for the entirety of the atomic age. The Russian and American arsenals — their growth, reduction and containment — have defined this era; maintaining an uneasy peace between the two countries hinged on open communication channels, agreement on nuclear norms and diplomacy.
Little of that nuclear scaffolding exists with China. In Washington, how exactly to interpret Beijing’s sharp nuclear buildup is still a matter of debate. At best, American officials say, their Chinese counterparts are trying to catch up with the United States and Russia, which still each have roughly a 10-to-1 nuclear advantage over China with their stockpiles. At worst, they say, this is Beijing’s boldfaced attempt to deter the United States from defending Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, the most likely flashpoint for an armed conflict between the competing superpowers.
In truth, no one knows what China is planning. President Xi Jinping’s government, as with much of its domestic policy, releases vanishingly little information about its nuclear intentions, strategies or goals, and it has been equally unwilling to engage on arms control.
<!-- birdkit: do not modify this file -->