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• China, Vietnam’s ‘friendly’ vow on South China Sea tensions shows mutual trust: analysts
• India boosts naval power with growing nuclear submarine fleet but is it closing gap with China?
• China may face more tariffs if Trump wins election, Asia ties crucial: Chinese official
• China launches more satellites for Starlink rival G60 as it races to meet target
• China cybersecurity group seeks review of Intel products for possible breaches
• Hong Kong extends multi-entry visa to mainland China for non-permanent residents to 5 years
• Taiwan exchange group looks to animal ambassadors to ease tensions with mainland China
• China stimulus debate simmers on social – now you can’t follow an economist, fund manager
• China’s Guangzhou city sees Dengue fever cases rise by 73% in space of a week
• China, Thailand begin latest joint military drills as Beijing boosts defence ties
• Chinese President Xi visits Taiwan-facing island after PLA drills simulate blockade
• Lenovo partners with Meta, Nvidia for AI outside China
• China’s overcapacity could enable a green Marshall Plan
• Economist urges China to push further to elevate private sector as draft law disappoints
• EU braces for Chinese trade blows, Trump doubles down on China: 7 EV reads you missed
• Chinese economist calls for massive stimulus, saying 2008’s 4 trillion yuan not enough
• Hundreds of Chinese men arrested in Sri Lanka over online scams
• Qualcomm’s bid to buy Intel hinges partly on US election, China scrutiny, sources say
• What PLA Navy and China Coast Guard drills near Taiwan reveal about Beijing’s plans
• China looks to tackle problems for debt-ridden local authorities with water tax reforms
• China ‘crying wedding’ custom sees women singing farewell laments for life they leave behind
• First king in China? Archaeologists uncover extra-large tomb at Neolithic burial site
• Taiwan and trade: how China sees its future with the US after the election
• David Lammy urged to raise human rights concerns on China trip
• [Sport] Pandas from China seen exploring new home at DC Zoo
• China’s ICBM test may well redraw the global security landscape
• From China with love: coastguard’s ‘creepy’ message to Taiwan during military drills
• How China used a ‘paper tiger’ to emerge as a nuclear weapon superpower

China, Vietnam’s ‘friendly’ vow on South China Sea tensions shows mutual trust: analysts

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3282639/china-vietnams-friendly-vow-south-china-sea-tensions-shows-mutual-trust-analysts?utm_source=rss_feed

China and Vietnam’s reiteration of a pledge to better manage maritime disputes following a violent confrontation just weeks ago is the result of restraint born out of political trust, according to analysts.

The two countries in a joint statement on Monday vowed to further manage tensions over the contested South China Sea “through friendly consultations” and cooperation.

However, while both socialist states aim to continue to address the dispute through dialogue, helped by party-to-party exchanges, observers expect differences to persist as both are firm on their positions.

Monday’s statement came as Chinese Premier Li Qiang wrapped up a visit to Vietnam where he met his counterpart, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, and top Vietnamese leader To Lam.

In the declaration, the two sides also pledged to “refrain from taking actions that complicate the situation and widen disputes”.

They will also begin joint maritime development in “areas of low sensitivity”, and strengthen exchanges between their defence and security arms.

“Defence and security cooperation is an important pillar of Sino-Vietnamese relations,” the statement issued in Hanoi said, adding that the two sides agreed to further strengthen exchanges between their militaries “at various levels”.

The neighbours also pledged greater cooperation in the economic, public security, and anti-terrorism spheres, as well in fighting challenges including external interference and separatism.

Observers said the similar governing systems in China and Vietnam could help them to adopt restraint over rival maritime claims, partly due to the need for mutual political trust and expanded communication channels.

However, despite a “high” in bilateral ties amid regular top-level exchanges, a fundamental change in their respective positions on the dispute was unlikely, the analysts warned.

Zhu Feng, the executive dean of Nanjing University’s School of International Studies said that both countries were working to avoid having the South China Sea issue become the “exclusive point” in bilateral relations.

“China-Vietnam disputes in the South China Sea have always existed, but the two sides have maintained dialogue and communication, and are maintaining the status quo to prevent more destructive actions,” he said.

According to Ding Duo, an associate research fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in the Chinese island province of Hainan, shared socialist systems meant China and Vietnam had more engagement and consultation channels compared to other regional claimants, especially via relations between their respective communist parties.

“As for Vietnam’s position and practice on the South China Sea issue, China will also negotiate and communicate with Vietnam through party-to-party channels,” Ding said.

“China-Vietnam relations are currently at a high level. Moreover, the political mutual trust between the two sides and the exchanges in various fields have been deepening, and the overall atmosphere [in bilateral relations] is relatively good.”

In August, Vietnamese President To chose China for his first foreign visit after taking over as leader of the Communist Party of Vietnam.

Meeting To in Beijing, President Xi Jinping reaffirmed that China’s “high-level and strategic” ties with Vietnam were a “priority” in its neighbourhood diplomacy.

Ding said recent engagements indicated “a high level of cooperation” featuring “practical demands and mutual trust”.

However, “fundamental disagreements over the South China Sea” might be difficult to resolve, he argued.

“Despite the current goodwill of Hanoi, we have to remember that Vietnam’s position on the South China Sea is still relatively firm,” he said, highlighting “some initiatives that have triggered serious concerns in China”.

China and Vietnam are among rival claimants to the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the resource-rich, economically important waterway.

China has been irked by recent actions from Vietnam, including its coastguard cooperation with the Philippines, another South China Sea claimant, and rapid island reclamation projects in the disputed areas – something Beijing is also accused of doing.

Vietnam has also stepped up exchanges with the United States in recent years, elevating bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership when President Joe Biden visited in September last year.

Biden, whose trip to Hanoi came three months before a visit by Xi, also vowed to maintain “peace and stability” in the region, especially the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, Beijing’s increasingly unyielding attitude in the contested waters has worried Hanoi.

Earlier this month, Vietnam accused Chinese law enforcement of beating fishermen and seizing equipment from a boat operating near the Paracels, which Vietnam claims as the Hoang Sa. China called its actions “professional and restrained”.

“Vietnam’s policy is obvious,” according to Zhu. “On the one hand, it maintains relations with both China and the United States, and on the other hand, it defends its interests in the South China Sea through China and the United States,” he said.

“But the risks certainly cannot be ruled out; how far Vietnam’s political reforms, economic and social development will actually go, and the direction of future US-China relations, will all be the tests that Sino-Vietnamese relations face.”

India boosts naval power with growing nuclear submarine fleet but is it closing gap with China?

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3282628/india-boosts-naval-power-growing-nuclear-submarine-fleet-it-closing-gap-china?utm_source=rss_feed

India’s fleet expansion of nuclear-powered submarines will significantly boost its security interests in the Indian Ocean as it jostles for influence with China, but a yawning technological gap still exists between New Delhi and Beijing, observers say.

The South Asian nation last month added its second nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarine and is expected to deploy one more next year, but it is still seen as being on the shorter end of the power imbalance in the region.

The nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arighaat – which means “destroyer of enemies” in Sanskrit – is believed to have a similar configuration to its predecessor INS Arihant, though authorities are tight-lipped on details of its weapons platform.

Both underwater vessels are armed with K-15 Sagarika ballistic missiles which are thought to have a range of about 750km. In comparison, Chinese submarines have a range of at least 8,000km to 10,000km, analysts say.

“As a kind of deterrent signal to China … Indian subs [when fully operational] will be on extended prowl in the Indian Ocean Region and elsewhere if required,” said C Uday Bhaskar, director of the New Delhi-based Society for Policy Studies and a retired commodore.

“But these numbers will not provide adequate ‘sufficiency’. More underwater platforms of this type will be required. And whether they will be acquired [ …] will depend on what India decides to prioritise by way of its transborder military capability.”

Tensions between India and China have simmered ever since a border clash between their troops four years ago, despite signs of a thaw lately following talks.

The Indian Ocean region has remained a potential flashpoint as both countries rely on the trade routes for sourcing a majority of their energy imports and other raw materials, as well as exporting an array of merchandise across the world.

India is expected to deploy its third nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine INS Aridhaman early next year, which may be equipped with a K-4 missile with a range exceeding 3,000km, local media reports say.

A fleet of three such submarines is generally considered the minimum that a country needs to maintain a deterrence patrol at any one time to allow for repairs and maintenance, experts say. Such a capability is needed to maintain a triad of land, air and sea nuclear deterrent against rivals, they add.

India is also reportedly building a fourth nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarine, which will be higher-powered than the first three submarines and equipped with the longer-range ballistic missiles.

“We need longer-range missiles on nuclear submarines, which is a capability that China has already demonstrated. We have land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, but we don’t have adequate range on our submarine-based missiles,” said Ashok Mehta, an independent defence analyst.

Delhi follows a no-first strike nuclear weapons policy, which is premised on striking back only when attacked by another nation. In such an eventuality, maintaining a combined nuclear deterrent is vital for striking back because an aggressor’s first strike will aim to cripple retaliatory capabilities, experts say.

Other nuclear powers such as the United Kingdom and France maintain such continuous deterrence. Nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines are considered vital to such deterrent capabilities because of their ability to lurk undetected for long periods under vast expanses of the ocean.

India’s nuclear-capable ballistic missile submarines report to a strategic forces command, an authority that is responsible for command, control and operations of nuclear weapons.

With a growing second-strike capability, India will be better able to maintain a balance of power and deter aggressors, bolstering its ability to act as a security provider in the Indian Ocean with partners including the United States and Japan, analysts say.

“India will have to acquire the necessary technical and manufacturing competence to ramp up numbers. This domestic capability is currently below the median,” Bhaskar said.

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government since 2014, India has increasingly followed a Make in India policy to engage the domestic private sector in the manufacture of hi-tech defence equipment. While it has reduced expensive imports, it has also exacerbated concerns about falling behind on possessing the latest military technology.

India is a member of the Quad – a strategic partnership with Japan, Australia and the US that is committed to a stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

It could help India in a broad way counter any threat posed by China, “but India is not a military ally of the US or any other Quad member … To that extent, it will limit the military ‘help’ that Delhi can either expect to receive from Quad members or what it can bring to the table”, Bhaskar said.

Delhi’s nuclear and naval might may not match Beijing’s capabilities, but analysts say India’s growing arsenal will be able to menace most parts of China and that should act as a sufficient deterrent in the future.

India is also reportedly building two nuclear-powered attack submarines that can gather intelligence, track targets and destroy them.

On Tuesday, India signed a deal with the US State Department to buy 31 armed MQ-9B SkyGuardian and SeaGuardian High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) drones, according to the defence ministry. The drones will be predominantly used by the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean region.

Mehta expressed confidence that India would be able to ramp up its deterrence through nuclear-capable ballistic submarines in the future. “We will reach there,” he said.

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China may face more tariffs if Trump wins election, Asia ties crucial: Chinese official

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3282634/china-may-face-more-tariffs-if-trump-wins-election-asia-ties-crucial-chinese-official?utm_source=rss_feed

If former US president Donald Trump were to win next month’s election, China could expect a “race to the bottom” with high tariffs and “provocative actions” from its superpower rival, said a former dean at the prestigious Peking University, while stressing that Beijing should continue to cultivate strong ties with its Asian neighbours.

Jia Qingguo, who previously headed Peking University’s international relations school, said the presidential race in the US on November 5 was as “unpredictable” as the 2020 contest.

“If Trump wins, then we’ll see a [repeat of the situation] between China and the US during his last time in office – a race to the bottom, high tariffs and also very provocative actions like taking a phone call from [former Taiwanese leader] Tsai Ing-wen or [sending US] secretaries of state to visit Taiwan,” he said.

Jia, a member of China’s standing committee of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, was giving a lecture at the S.T. Lee Distinguished Annual Lecture in Singapore on Wednesday on how the coming US election could affect the superpower’s relationship with China and Southeast Asia.

His comments come after China staged a day of war games around Taiwan to send a warning against “separatist acts” earlier this week, a move which drew condemnation from Taiwan and the US.

Beijing views Taiwan as a renegade province that should be reintegrated into mainland control, by force if necessary. While many nations, including the US, do not officially acknowledge Taiwan as an independent state, they oppose any use of force to alter the status quo.

Trade ties between the US and China have frayed over the past year due to issues such as restrictions on electric vehicles and advanced semiconductors.

In his lecture, Jia said while Beijing should be “prepared to defend” its core interests and “fight back when provoked”, he urged officials not to “respond to every criticism on the official side”.

“A knee-jerk response to criticism is a sign of weakness rather than strength. You don’t want to get dragged into unnecessary conflicts in the South China Sea, Taiwan and by criticisms from the other side,” Jia said.

He also stressed that China should continue to cultivate strong relations with other countries, especially those in Asia, so that it could “shape policy, shape the relationship in a positive direction”.

On the US presidency, Jia said while it did not matter to China if a Republican or a Democrat were to win the election, Beijing would prefer the winning candidate to be from the incumbent’s party due to “policy continuity”.

US Vice-President Kamala Harris is the Democratic candidate contesting against Trump in the coming election.

“In a [US] presidential election, the opposition party has to condemn the ruling party’s policies when it comes to its China policy, invariably for all kinds of reasons, especially ideological and political reasons. The opposition party candidate would condemn the ruling party for being too soft on China and then would vow to make some changes,” Jia said.

In trying to keep to such campaign promises to get tough on China, it could lead to a period of tension between the two global powers after the election, he cautioned.

“We call this … a period of ‘getting used to each other’ but we can do without it if the incumbent party candidate wins the election because there is more policy continuity,” he said.

Jia stressed that the stance of the two US parties on key security and economic issues had shifted “a great deal” in recent years.

Traditionally, Republican candidates tended to promote free-trade policies and were less focused on human rights issues while the Democrats applied “less pressure” on security issues and were stronger on human rights issues, he said. The lines, however, had blurred since then, he added.

“Things have changed a great deal since then,” he said, citing tariffs imposed by the Trump administration and former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taipei as examples.

But Jia pointed out that Harris had yet to communicate a clear China policy.

In a debate between Harris and Trump in September, the candidates squared off on a range of issues including who would take a stronger stance on China.

Washington’s China policy would continue to be “tough and often rough” after the election as indicated by the debate, Jia said.

“Unless something dramatic occurs, the US would continue to be tough and even hostile to China. China does not have much alternative but to face it and deal with it,” he added.

China launches more satellites for Starlink rival G60 as it races to meet target

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3282631/china-launches-more-satellites-starlink-rival-g60-it-races-meet-target?utm_source=rss_feed

China has launched a second group of satellites for its G60 constellation to rival SpaceX’s Starlink, but the project could struggle to meet this year’s target.

Eighteen satellites were sent into their predetermined orbits on a Long March 6A rocket from the Taiyuan launch centre in Shanxi province, central China, on Tuesday evening.

The first 18 satellites for the constellation – run by government-backed Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (SSST) – were launched in early August.

Also known as Spacesail or Qianfan – meaning thousand sails – the project aims to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink with a low-orbit constellation of more than 10,000 satellites to provide global broadband network coverage and move towards 6G connectivity.

The Shanghai company behind the project has ambitious targets. Senior vice-president Lu Ben told state broadcaster CCTV in August that it aims to launch 108 satellites this year and 648 next year for regional network coverage. The goal is to complete the first stage of the project by 2027, with a constellation of 1,296 satellites to provide global coverage.

“We plan to further enhance the constellation’s services by lowering the satellite orbit from over 1,000km to 300-500km, facilitating direct mobile connections and advanced IoT applications, with a goal of having over 15,000 satellites by 2030,” Lu said.

That will require a number of satellite launches, meaning they will need to be frequent and cost-effective.

The first two launches have sent 18 satellites into orbit per rocket, so another four will be needed to reach this year’s target of 108. The company plans to increase this to 36 and then 54 satellites per rocket launch in future.

If it manages to launch 36 satellites at a time next year, it will mean another 33 rocket launches will be needed to reach the 2027 goal.

But in the following two years some 252 rocket launches would be required to meet the target of having 15,000 satellites in orbit by 2030.

Given the limited capacity of near-Earth orbit and Starlink’s first-mover advantage – it started launches in 2019 and has already sent more than 7,000 satellites into orbit – Chinese space companies are racing to catch up.

StarNet, another Chinese company, plans to build a constellation of nearly 13,000 satellites, with 10 per cent to be launched by 2030 and 1,800 sent into orbit every year after that.

A separate project known as Honghu-3 – led by Blue Arrow Aerospace’s Hongqing Technology – has also filed frequency and orbit applications with the International Telecommunication Union, aiming to launch a total of 10,000 satellites.

To reach the G60 target alone would require an estimated 300 rocket launches by 2030. A total of 67 rockets were launched from China last year.

Mass production of satellites will also be a challenge. The 36 satellites launched for the G60 constellation so far are all high-throughput flat-panel broadband communication satellites.

“They are designed for rapid deployment with a full-band, multi-layer, multi-orbit approach, ensuring all core technologies and the supply chain remain entirely domestically controlled,” according to the SSST website.

They are being manufactured at a purpose-built factory in Shanghai’s Songjiang district that draws on the streamlined assembly lines used in the aviation and automotive industries.

According to the Shanghai government, the factory can produce 300 of the satellites a year at present and that is expected to increase to 500 to 600 a year by 2026.

A Shanghai Securities News report in August said launch capabilities were the biggest issue for Chinese commercial aerospace companies.

“The gap in satellite manufacturing, mainly in mass production, is expected to be quickly narrowed,” the report said. “However, catching up on the manufacturing of very large rockets, achieving the capability to transport large payloads in space and reducing launch costs may take much longer.”

China cybersecurity group seeks review of Intel products for possible breaches

https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3282641/china-cybersecurity-group-seeks-review-intel-products-possible-breaches?utm_source=rss_feed

A Chinese cybersecurity group has called for a review of Intel products sold on the mainland, alleging that the US semiconductor giant’s chips pose a threat for “frequent vulnerabilities and high failure rates”.

The Cyber Security Association of China (CSAC) said in a WeChat post on Wednesday that Intel’s central processing units (CPUs) have shown multiple vulnerabilities in the past and that certain chip series from the firm caused video games to crash.

Such product weaknesses may expose users to hacking via a secret back-door system in Intel’s chips, according to the group. It also accused Intel of responding slowly to previous complaints about being breached.

The CSAC recommended a cybersecurity review of Intel’s products sold on the mainland “to effectively safeguard China’s national security and the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese consumers”.

Intel did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Wednesday.

The CSAC’s call for a cybersecurity review threatens to heat up tensions between Beijing and Washington, following US-led initiatives that restricted exports of advanced chips and semiconductor-manufacturing equipment to the mainland.

The controversy involving Intel comes more than a year after Micron Technology, the largest memory chip maker in the US, became the first foreign semiconductor company to be put under such a review by China.

Intel’s CPUs are used as main processors in consumer electronics products such as laptops and data-centre servers in China. Servers based on Intel’s X86 chip architecture accounted for 90 per cent of China’s CPU server market in 2023, with British chip design Arm making up for 10 per cent, according to a recent report by the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, a government-backed think tank.

China accounted for 27 per cent of Intel’s total revenue of US$54.2 billion in 2023, according to the firm’s annual report published in January.

The CSAC said that Intel benefited not only from the China market, but also the US Chips and Science Act that provides subsidies to boost American semiconductor research, development and production.

In its WeChat post, the CSAC singled out several Intel chip security vulnerabilities, including Downfall, GhostRace and NativeBHI.

Downfall, also known as Gather Data Sampling by Intel, was discovered in 2022, but only made public in 2023. It enabled attackers to steal sensitive data through so-called speculative execution flaws.

According to the CSAC post, it took Intel more than half a year to address the video game-crashing issue in the company’s 13th and 14th generation Core processor series, which drew many user complaints in late 2023. In July this year, Intel attributed the problem to “a microcode algorithm” that resulted in “incorrect voltage requests to the processor”.

Citing hardware security expert Damien Zammit, the CSAC post accused Intel chips of having a secret back-door system that could be used by hackers to launch cyberattacks or access content without a user’s knowledge.

In 2016, Zammit said Intel’s X86 CPU had a secret subsystem called Management Engine (ME) that works as a separate processor core inside a CPU and cannot be disabled, owing to its hidden proprietary codes. Many cybersecurity professionals reckon ME as a potential security risk because there is no official way to disable it.

According to an article by tech media TechRepublic that cited an Intel statement, the ME was in place so that enterprises can manage computers remotely via the Active Management Technology feature.

Shares of Nasdaq-listed Intel fell 3.33 per cent to US$22.66 in pre-market trading on Wednesday.

Founded in 2016 under the supervision of the Cyberspace Administration of China, the CSAC counts as members some of the country’s major tech companies including Alibaba Group Holding, Tencent Holdings, Baidu and Huawei Technologies. Alibaba owns the South China Morning Post.

Hong Kong extends multi-entry visa to mainland China for non-permanent residents to 5 years

https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3282642/hong-kong-extends-multi-entry-visa-non-permanent-residents-5-years-attract-investors?utm_source=rss_feed

Non-permanent Hong Kong residents holding a foreign passport can visit mainland China for a longer period of five years with a multiple-entry visa starting on Wednesday, a new measure announced by the city’s leader to attract more foreigners to set up businesses in the city and reinforce its status as an international trading hub.

Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu also said on Wednesday that Hong Kong would offer more tax concessions to attract maritime services businesses and commodity traders. The plans were delivered in his policy address as part of efforts to boost the city’s shipping strength.

“The development of international financial, shipping and trading centres is closely intertwined,” Lee said. “Besides expanding and strengthening our existing businesses, we will also explore new growth areas.”

Starting from Wednesday, the validity period of a multiple-entry visa for the city’s non-permanent residents with foreign passports to travel to the mainland will be extended to a maximum of five years from the current two years.

Those working for companies registered in Hong Kong will also enjoy priority in application processing.

“The new measure is to facilitate travel for those residents to the mainland and also help attract more foreigners to establish businesses in Hong Kong,” a government source said.

Residents who are travelling to the mainland for business, tourism, family visits and cultural and academic exchanges can apply for multiple-entry visas valid for up to five years with a duration of up to 180 days for each stay, according to the Commissioner’s Office of China’s Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong.

It added the new visa policy would “facilitate personnel exchanges between Hong Kong and the mainland, and support Hong Kong’s integration into the overall development of the country”.

The applicants would be exempted from submitting round-trip transport tickets and hotel reservations.

Those whose fingerprints had been collected when obtaining visas from the country’s visa-issuing authorities abroad would be exempted from doing so again.

But foreign domestic helpers are not included in the visa policy, it added.

The multiple-entry visa to the mainland was introduced in last year’s policy address for city residents with foreign passports.

Those who are permanent residents could apply for a five-year multiple-entry visa, but non-permanent residents, who had lived in Hong Kong for less than seven years, could only apply for a two-year one previously.

There were 28,800 holders of such visas, including both permanent and non-permanent residents, as of this month, according to the source.

Separately, the authorities would also provide better export protection for businesses to encourage firms, especially small- and medium-sized ones, to expand outside the city.

The statutory maximum indemnity percentage of the Hong Kong Export Credit Insurance Corporation will be increased from 90 per cent to 95 per cent. The body provides cover for local exporters and manufacturers to compensate for their losses in transactions.

Lee said to strengthen the city’s status as a global shipping hub, the government would explore introducing tax concessions along with other support measures to attract more commodity traders from mainland and other places to set up businesses in Hong Kong, with the goal to build a “commodity trading ecosystem” in the city.

The details on the tax concessions would be released in the first half of next year, a government source said.

The government has offered tax exemptions for ship leasing businesses and offered half-rate tax concessions for marine insurance as well as ship management, agency and broking to lure in more shipping commercial principals and maritime service businesses to Hong Kong.

Lee added the government would enhance the preferential tax regime, including introducing new tax deduction arrangements for ship lessors.

“We will step up our efforts in fostering Hong Kong’s maritime industry while taking a multipronged approach to consolidate our status as an international shipping centre,” Lee said.

The city will also restructure an existing body into a Hong Kong Maritime and Port Development Board under the Transport and Logistics Bureau to assist the government in formulating policies and long-term development strategies.

Hong Kong is one of the world’s busiest ports, which ranks fourth in the International Shipping Centre Development Index.

The average length of stay of container vessels in the Hong Kong port is 0.95 days, about half the average of 1.85 days for the world’s top 20 container ports.

Taiwan exchange group looks to animal ambassadors to ease tensions with mainland China

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3282643/taiwan-exchange-group-looks-animal-ambassadors-ease-tensions-mainland-china?utm_source=rss_feed

The semi-official Taiwanese body responsible for liaising with mainland China has suggested sending a couple of deer across the Taiwan Strait as a peace offering.

Luo Wen-jia, secretary general of the Straits Exchange Foundation, said the body was considering offering a mainland zoo a pair of Sika deer named he he and ping ping – names based on the word he ping, which means peace.

“We are working on this with the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait [the equivalent mainland body] to make contact with the zoo in Fuzhou city,” Luo told Taiwanese media.

He was speaking during a visit to Daiqu, an uninhabited Taiwanese-held island a few kilometres from the mainland which is known for its sika deer.

The offer comes at a low point in cross-strait relations and follows Monday’s extensive blockade drills by the People’s Liberation Army that were designed to send a message of “stern deterrence to the separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces”.

The exercise followed a defiant speech by Taiwanese leader William Ching-te last Thursday, in which he claimed Beijing had no authority to represent the island.

However, on the same day as the Daiqu visit, Luo rejected the 1992 consensus – an unofficial agreement that there is only one China but the two sides may disagree about what that means – which Beijing insists must form the basis of the cross strait relations.

Luo said the Straits Exchange Foundation can find no record of the agreement in any of its records or files and even if it existed, it could not be the framework for managing cross-strait ties.

The foundation was set up in the 1990s to serve as Taipei’s “white glove” that could talk to Beijing in the absence of official exchanges. It played a key role when Ma Ying-jeou, from the mainland-friendly Kuomintang, was the island’s leader between 2008 and 2016 and adopted a policy of engaging Beijing.

Beijing views Taiwan as part of its territory that must be reunited with the mainland, by force if necessary. Most countries, including Taiwan’s main international supporter the United States, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington opposes any attempt to take the island by force and is legally bound to arm the island to help it defend itself.

Luo is a veteran politician from the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party, who was appointed to the foundation in May to serve as deputy to its new chairman Cheng Wen-tsan.

Cheng told Taiwan’s government-funded Central News Agency that the two would “form a strong team that can promote positive developments in cross-strait relations” but he stepped down after a month in the post amid a bribery investigation.

China stimulus debate simmers on social – now you can’t follow an economist, fund manager

https://www.scmp.com/economy/policy/article/3282623/china-stimulus-debate-simmers-social-now-you-cant-follow-economist-fund-manager?utm_source=rss_feed

A slew of stimulus measures announced by Beijing since late last month, while having rallied the interest of China’s roughly 200 million retail investors, have also sparked divisive debate over their immediate impact on economic prospects and investment decisions – as highlighted in the opposing assessments by a prominent economist and star fund manager in recent days.

The policy decisions have also triggered government scrutiny over leveraging, as the 2015 stock market rout and its hard-learned lessons continue to haunt financial regulators.

Meanwhile, sizzling discussions across Chinese social media have followed wild market swings this month – the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index fell 1.72 per cent over the past week in the absence of a headline stimulus figure from the top economic planner and the finance ministry.

And as of Friday, Bloomberg data had shown that the 10-day realised price swings of the benchmark CSI 300 Index had reached a level not seen since August 2015, with the volatility being amplified as day traders resorted to profit-taking, taking advantage of the rapid rise in stock prices.

“Those who shouted about the bull market – the ‘experts’, ‘scholars’ and media writers who encouraged retail investors to dive in – should they come out and apologise?” Dan Bin, president at the Shenzhen-based financial institution FEOSO Harbour Investment Management, said in a Weibo post on Friday.

Dan is an influential investor, and his account on Weibo – the Chinese equivalent to X, formally known as Twitter – has 13 million followers.

Afterward, in a post widely seen among netizens as a response to Dan’s critical assessment, economist Ren Zeping, who has 5.55 million followers on Weibo and is no stranger to controversy – having previously provoked the ire of online censors by discussing hot-button issues – called out “bizarre perspectives” that took unscrupulously bearish takes on China’s economy and the state of public affairs.

“Can they only see the positivity of other countries’ economies and stock markets?” he said. “Little do they know that [the growth of] China’s economy has been leading not only the United States, but also the world, over the past decades.”

According to a report by Shanghai-based media outlet Yicai Global, Ren expected that Beijing’s policies would continue to “exert strength” to revive the economy, and that the stock market would enjoy a prolonged bullish run.

And while acknowledging that people can be bearish on the stock market while offering differing opinions, he drew a line when it comes to being bearish on the Chinese economy and policies.

“We need to stand with the motherland in these critical times and say something constructive,” he was quoted as saying.

Since Tuesday, Weibo users were unable to follow the accounts of Dan and Ren, and their original posts had been deleted.

The recent surge in investor interest was reflected in the number of new A-share accounts created during the National Day holiday week – with more than a tenfold increase compared with other times in the year, and millennials were seen as taking the lead.

Subsequently, China’s central bank ordered commercial banks last week to scrutinise loans to prevent them from being used in stock investments. And on Monday, a Guangzhou-based small lender association sent an alert to its member firms, warning against the use of credit in the stock market.

Dong Yu, executive vice-president of the China Institute for Development Planning at Tsinghua University, said in a column for China News Service on Sunday that it was “important to explain clearly the internal logic of the stimulus measures to enhance confidence among investors and in the market”.

“Related government departments should increase communications with the market – answering whatever questions they ask and eliminating whatever worries they have – to build up the trust of the market towards policies,” he said.

Dong added that macroeconomic regulations are not all directed at the stock market, and are rather part of a concerted effort to resolve the bottleneck of economic problems, from the property-market crisis and high levels of local government debt to the difficulties facing private firms and weak domestic demand.

“Only when these basic facets of the economy are properly dealt with can the healthy development of the economy be reflected in the long-term health of the stock market,” he added.

China’s Guangzhou city sees Dengue fever cases rise by 73% in space of a week

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3282620/chinas-guangzhou-city-sees-dengue-fever-cases-rise-73pc-space-week?utm_source=rss_feed

The southern Chinese city of Guangzhou has seen a 73 per cent spike in Dengue fever cases in the space of a week.

Last week it recorded 437 cases, of which 360 were local and the rest imported. It also saw the first severe cases, three in total, in several months. The previous week saw 252 cases, according to the local centre for disease control and prevention.

The Guangdong provincial disease control authorities have been closely watching the rise in cases of the mosquito-borne disease over the past two months.

In August the province’s disease control centre called for a state of high alert in its monthly report on infectious diseases because of the global rise in cases this year.

Since then there has been a steady rise in cases across Guangdong, with more in a single week – 1,770 between September 30 and October 6 – than the whole month of August, which saw 1,220 cases.

No deaths have been reported in Guangdong this year though the disease can be fatal.

Fatal cases of Dengue fever are rare in China, given the relatively good healthcare infrastructure, with the last death recorded in September last year.

Guangdong latest “mosquito map” – which tracks the main danger areas as part of its strategy to monitor the risk from Dengue and other mosquito-borne diseases – shows that by mid-September there were 10 spots with a high-density of the insects in Guangzhou, as well as four in Zhuhai and two in Shenzhen.

Since the beginning of 2024, over 13 million cases and more than 8,500 dengue-related deaths have been reported globally, according to the European Centre of Disease Prevention and Control.

The World Health Organization has warned that Dengue cases have roughly doubled each year since 2021 and in December last year it raised its emergency response level to Grade 3, its highest level.

It said factors such as unplanned urbanisation, poor sanitation and hygiene practices, climate change and international travel are helping it spread rapidly around the world.

The global health body also warned that other factors such as climate change and periodic weather phenomena such as El Nino and La Nina – which can cause heavy rainfall and higher temperatures – are helping it spread rapidly around the world.

Chinese customs have also issued a notice, effective from October 9, ordering better cleaning of imported goods and containers, port areas and surveillance of travellers showing symptoms of Dengue fever.

Symptoms of the illness include fever, severe headaches, muscle and joint pain, vomiting, swollen lymph nodes and rashes.

While human-to human transmission is not possible, humans can pass it on to mosquitos which will then go on to infect more people.

Professor Emily Chan Ying-yang, assistant dean of the faculty of medicine of Chinese University of Hong Kong, said: “When a mosquito bites a person who carries Dengue fever, the mosquito will then become a vector for the rest of its life of 60 days and may spread the disease to other people when it bites someone else.”

She said the city should step up its mosquito controls and warned that residents crossing the border to visit Guangdong should take precautions to protect themselves.

The city’s health authorities have recorded 85 cases this year as of October 9 – more than the 62 recorded for the whole of 2023. The recent cases included eight imported cases between October 4 and 9 – all from people who have been to Guangdong recently.

China, Thailand begin latest joint military drills as Beijing boosts defence ties

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3282613/china-thailand-begin-latest-joint-military-drills-beijing-boosts-defence-ties?utm_source=rss_feed

China and Thailand emphasised counterterrorism operations as their militaries kicked off an 11-day joint military training exercise in the Chinese city of Kunming on Tuesday, with drills that feature manned-unmanned combat devices such as drones.

The exercises, dubbed “Strike-2024”, are being staged 800km (500 miles) north of the Thai border in a challenging landscape and include hostage rescues, special demolitions, helicopter deployments and search and sweep exercises, according to the People’s Liberation Army Daily

The goal is to enhance joint operational capabilities “under complex situations”, such as difficult mountain and jungle terrain, and counter cross-border criminal activities and non-traditional security threats to “contribute positively to regional stability”, the paper reported.

After an opening ceremony, Thai soldiers observed Chinese troops practising combat drills, and were given hands-on experience with light weapons, unmanned combat equipment, and reconnaissance devices used by the Chinese side.

Video from Chinese state broadcaster CCTV showed the Thai army – which normally uses US-supplied weapons – practising drills with different models of Chinese-made Type-95-1 assault rifles.

The exercise is the seventh in the “Strike” series between the two countries’ armed forces, and is being held as China ramps up defence ties to strengthen political trust with its Southeast Asian neighbours.

According to a report by the US Naval War College, Southeast Asia is the only region where the number of China’s joint military exercises has returned to pre-pandemic levels.

Those joint drills have included the China-Singapore “Exercise Cooperation-2024” near the city of Zhanjiang, which ended on September 5, as well as the China-Laos “Friendship Shield-2024” held in July, and the China-Cambodia “Golden Dragon-2024” drill staged in May.

China and Thailand also held the “Falcon Strike-2024” joint air force training exercise at the Udorn Royal Thai Airforce Base in Bangkok in August.

China has historically maintained closer military relationships with Cambodia and Laos, but the recent exercises with Thailand – a long-time US military ally – have drawn attention for incorporating rare combat elements deemed “necessary for a small-scale war”, military analyst and former PLA officer Fu Qianshao told the Post in August.

China was the largest arms supplier to Thailand from 2019 to 2023, accounting for 44 per cent of the country’s major weapon imports, more than double the amount from the previous four-year period, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Beijing has attempted to expand its arms sales to other Southeast Asian countries, but has only seen limited progress amid pressure from the US.

Chinese President Xi visits Taiwan-facing island after PLA drills simulate blockade

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3282578/chinese-president-xi-visits-taiwan-facing-island-after-pla-drills-simulate-blockade?utm_source=rss_feed

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited a coastal island just across the Taiwan Strait a day after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) wrapped up massive military drills around Taiwan.

Xi inspected Dongshan county in the southeastern province of Fujian on Tuesday afternoon, state broadcaster CCTV reported.

The Taiwan-facing island county has served as a regular base for PLA exercises in the past. According to the CCTV report on Wednesday, Xi inspected work on rural vitalisation, inheriting the Communist Party’s revolutionary tradition and protecting cultural heritage.

But the report did not say where Xi started his trip in Fujian or when he was due to leave the province.

Most domestic inspections by Xi usually feature a stop at a local PLA division. But it is unclear if he had done so or planned to do so on this trip.

On Monday evening, the PLA on wrapped up a 13-hour exercise encircling Taiwan, simulating a blockade. Dubbed “Joint Sword-2024B”, the drills focused on sea and air combat readiness patrols and the ability to blockade key ports.

PLA Navy aircraft carrier Liaoning also sailed to a strategic location to the east of Taiwan as part of the exercise, with state media releasing footage of fighter jets taking off from the warship in the dark.

Beijing said the drills were a “deterrent” to Taiwan independence forces.

The exercises came four days after Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te’s “Double Tenth” speech marking 113 years of the founding of the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name.

Lai reiterated that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were “not subordinate to each other” and that Beijing “had no authority” to represent the island.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including Taiwan’s major backer the United States, do not recognise the self-governed island as an independent state. But Washington is opposed to any attempt to take Taiwan by force and is committed to arming it for defence.

Double Tenth on October 10 has been celebrated in Taiwan since 1949, when the Nationalists or Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to the island following their defeat to the communists in the Chinese civil war. The date marks the anniversary of the start of the 1911 revolution that led to the founding of the ROC on the mainland.

Dongshan became a major cross-strait battlefield in 1953, when the KMT unsuccessfully tried to retake the PLA-controlled island – in what was the last attempt by the Taiwanese army to attack the mainland.

President Xi on Tuesday visited a memorial hall dedicated to a Dongshan party secretary who played a significant role in that battle, state news agency Xinhua reported.

The PLA has repeatedly conducted drills on Dongshan island and its surrounding waters, including landing exercises, most recently in 2019 when it crossed the sensitive median line in the Taiwan Strait.

According to an article in August by the local veterans’ affairs bureau, the PLA frequently conducts drills in Dongshan due to its “unique geographical location and topographical characteristics”, and the local government “gathers the entire county’s resources” to facilitate the exercises every year.

As the latest drills encircled Taiwan, officials from the Central Military Commission, Beijing’s top military decision-making body, and senior PLA generals held a high-level meeting over Monday and Tuesday to discuss “military theoretical work”.

Xi did not attend the meeting but gave instructions, calling for the modernisation of military theories to adapt to evolving technology and warfare, according to Xinhua.

“There have been profound changes in China’s security and development needs, and the task of building a strong military has become even more urgent,” Xi was quoted as saying.

According to Xinhua, the most recent instance of Xi appearing in public was on Monday morning, when he paid his final respects to Wu Bangguo, mainland China’s former legislative head who died on October 8.

Lenovo partners with Meta, Nvidia for AI outside China

https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3282586/lenovo-partners-meta-nvidia-ai-outside-china?utm_source=rss_feed

Lenovo Group is partnering with Meta Platforms and Nvidia to boost its artificial intelligence (AI) offerings in markets outside China, as the world’s biggest personal computer (PC) maker seeks to maintain an edge amid fierce competition and geopolitical constraints.

Lenovo is launching a personal AI assistant named AI Now for PCs sold outside China, which is built upon Meta’s open source Llama 3.1 large language model, the company said at its annual Tech World conference in Seattle on Wednesday.

The AI Now chatbot is able to run on PCs locally without an internet connection, and can perform tasks such as managing documents, generating text and images, and configuring device settings with natural language prompts from users, according to Lenovo, which sponsored the South China Morning Post’s trip to the conference.

The local AI agent can “differentiate” Lenovo and “set it apart from others” in the market, Lenovo chairman and chief executive Yang Yuanqing said at the event on Wednesday.

AI Now will not be available on Lenovo PCs sold in China, where the computer giant in April announced its Chinese AI agent Lenovo Xiaotian, which is built on Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba Group Holding’s large language model Tongyi Qianwen. Alibaba owns the Post.

On Wednesday, Yang also made a high-profile announcement to deepen the company’s collaboration with chip maker Nvidia, jointly launching a range of enterprise-facing AI solutions, including an AI server equipped with Nvidia’s new Blackwell graphics processing units (GPUs) and Lenovo’s water-cooling technology.

The product, the Lenovo ThinkSystem SC777 V4 Neptune, will not be sold to Chinese enterprises “because of [US] restrictions”, Che Min Jammi Tu, Lenovo senior vice-president and group operations officer, told the Post on Wednesday in an interview on the sidelines of the Tech World conference.

Nvidia’s most powerful Blackwell line, including the B100, B200 and GB200, is among a growing list of GPU models that are barred by the US from being shipped to China as the US intensifies efforts to curb China’s access to advanced US technologies.

Geopolitical challenges remain the biggest risk factor for supply chains right now, according to Tu. Lenovo is also using AI to detect supply chain risks, with its AI-powered Supply Chain Intelligence solution having helped Lenovo reduce manufacturing and logistics costs by around 20 per cent, the company said in its latest annual report.

The PC giant on Wednesday also launched a new AI PC built with Intel processors, the ThinkPad X1 2-in-1 Gen 10 Aura Edition, and concept prototypes including the Lenovo “AI Buddy”, an interactive module to help users perform daily tasks such as ticket booking.

“Lenovo is trying to ride the AI PC wave in an effort to boost sales in an otherwise flat market,” said Bryan Ma, vice-president of client devices research at IDC.

Creating separate generative AI software for China and the rest of the world, using different partners, is partly “due to regulatory conditions in China”, but it could also help Lenovo as a “competitive differentiator outside of China”, according to Ma.

One of Lenovo’s advantages in the AI PC era is its full range of product offerings thanks to its supply chain capabilities, according to Ivan Lam, senior research analyst at Counterpoint Research.

“Its relationship with all AI-related chip vendors is very close,” Lam said. “It’s using their chips to create different combinations to launch products at different levels, including enterprise-facing and consumer-facing products.”

Lenovo’s product portfolio already includes more than 65 AI devices for businesses and consumers, executive vice-president and president of Lenovo’s Intelligent Devices Group Luca Rossi said on Wednesday.

China’s overcapacity could enable a green Marshall Plan

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3282540/chinas-overcapacity-could-enable-green-marshall-plan?utm_source=rss_feed

At an international symposium on “80 Years after Bretton Woods” in Hangzhou in May, I proposed a “Global South Green Development Plan”, which was later dubbed the Chinese Marshall Plan.

The proposal includes three goals: assisting developing countries’ green development, expanding China’s aggregate demand and enhancing China’s global leadership. Like the original Marshall Plan, the plan would provide large volumes of commercial credit and investment, policy loans and government aid.

I was inspired by recent discussions about China’s overcapacity in key green industries: electric vehicles (EVs), lithium batteries and solar panels. In April, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen raised this issue and voiced two concerns: that Chinese overcapacity looked like the result of state subsidies, and that it had reached a scale that was disrupting international markets. A month later, the United States announced a 100 per cent tariff on EVs from China.

Defining “overcapacity” can be controversial. As some Chinese experts have pointed out, if Chinese companies can sell their products, whether at home or abroad, there is no overcapacity. So, if we understand overcapacity as a case of supply exceeding demand, it may be useful to distinguish between the domestic and the global context.

Three sets of factors are relevant here: macroeconomic imbalances, explicit and implicit subsidisation and the size of the industry in question. “Domestic” overcapacity has characterised China’s entire post-1970s reform period, because the country has produced more than it consumes, as evidenced by a large current-account surplus.

The first step to addressing overcapacity, then, is to balance the current account. In fact, the Chinese authorities have been working towards this goal ever since the 2008 global financial crisis, by boosting domestic consumption.

Americans and Europeans are more concerned about explicit and implicit state subsidies, which they claim give Chinese manufacturers an unfair advantage in international markets.

But China’s explicit subsidies for EVs – including direct subsidies, tax reductions and exclusive licences – are about average among a dozen countries surveyed in a 2022 working paper.

Implicit subsidies – reduced factor costs – are less transparent. In a July speech on “Chinese overcapacity and the global economy”, US Treasury Undersecretary for International Affairs Jay Shambaugh cited an analysis by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies that estimated China’s implicit subsidies to be about 5 per cent of gross domestic product – 10 times the level of the US, Japan and some other countries.

While these figures are similar to what I found in my own research about 15 years ago, Shambaugh and the CSIS researchers’ interpretation is flawed. China’s factor-cost distortion was devised not as part of an industrial strategy, but as a transition policy, and most of the support went to state-owned enterprises. If anything, privately owned Chinese green-tech companies competing internationally were significantly disadvantaged by this policy.

That said, various “investment-promotion programmes” introduced by local governments have provided implicit subsidies – for example, reduced land-use fees – to private green-tech companies. The European Union’s recent investigation suggests that subsidies permit Chinese EVs to be sold for 20 per cent less than models produced in the EU.

But the support from local governments is rapidly declining, partly because many are facing fiscal difficulties, and partly because the central government has begun prohibiting such irregular and illegal subsidies.

Another issue is that the perceived impact of Chinese overcapacity is exaggerated by the sheer size of the Chinese economy. China is a massive country and its economic policies tend to concentrate investment in certain sectors and industries. This can create difficulties for China’s trading partners. The point, though, is that the size of China’s green-tech sectors is probably a larger problem than subsidies.

China does need to reduce the influence of state direction on resource allocation and it needs to work with other countries to ensure mutual prosperity through cooperation. This was the rationale behind my proposal for a green development plan for the Global South. China has already built substantial production capacity in green-tech sectors, but it faces rising barriers in developed markets.

At the same time, developing countries are struggling to advance their own green development agendas. According to the United Nations, “Developing countries need renewable energy investments of about US$1.7 trillion annually but attracted foreign direct investment in clean energy worth only US$544 billion in 2022.”

Fortunately, China has the technology, production capacity and capital (commercial financing, policy financing and government aid) to help fill this gap. It can drive global green development, boost its own economy and strengthen its international leadership all at the same time.

Interestingly, in late August, Brian Deese, the director of the White House National Economic Council from 2021 to 2023, made the “case for a clean energy Marshall Plan” and alluded to the fact that China is considering the same idea. Ideally, the two countries would collaborate on this initiative. But even if they each pursued separate green Marshall Plans, they would accelerate the global green transition dramatically.

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Economist urges China to push further to elevate private sector as draft law disappoints

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3282611/economist-urges-china-push-further-elevate-private-sector-draft-law-disappoints?utm_source=rss_feed

The status of the private sector should be raised under China’s private economy promotion law, a leading economist said amid widespread disappointment about a draft of the law that is out for public comment until November 8.

The introduction of the first basic law regarding the development of the private sector is a “milestone” event, according to Teng Tai, director and chief economist of the Wanbo New Economic Research Institute in Beijing.

However, the legal status of private companies should be elevated to reassure private business owners that Beijing’s support is not a “makeshift” policy, Teng wrote on Tuesday in the WeChat account of Zhenghe Island, a platform for private entrepreneurs.

The 77-article draft – basically a wrap-up of policies launched in recent years to boost private sector confidence in the economy – was compiled to “address concerns of various parties”, “stabilise expectations for the long term” and support the “healthy development” of private companies and their owners, the Ministry of Justice and the National Development and Reform Commission said in a joint statement last week.

The draft includes measures to promote fair market competition; enhance the investment and financing environment; encourage private involvement in scientific projects and technological innovation; and also ensure private companies follow the “correct political direction”.

It follows the third plenum in July, a key conclave of the Communist Party of China that sets the economic blueprint for the next five to 10 years, when the party elites decided to enact the law to mobilise private entrepreneurs amid the country’s faltering economic recovery and mounting challenges from a tech war with the US and its allies.

“The private economy is an important part of the socialist market economy and an important force for China’s modernisation”, the draft said.

Teng argued that the draft was insufficient and should state that the private economy is an important constituent and a “source of vitality” to reflect the fact the private sector contributes 60 per cent of government tax revenues and creates 80 per cent of jobs.

He suggested the law should include that “developing the private sector is a long-term goal in the construction of a socialist market economy” to show the determination of the party and dispel concerns that private entrepreneurs are only needed in times of crisis.

After all, there would be no market economy without the participation of private companies, as transactions among state-owned enterprises were “mock trades” and the market was a “mock market”, he wrote.

Business sentiment has been in a prolonged downturn since China imposed strict Covid-19 curbs during the pandemic and Beijing conducted regulatory crackdowns to rein in “the blind expansion of capital” in private sectors such as the internet, property development, peer-to-peer financial platforms and off-campus education.

Teng proposed that the law should ensure that government procurement at all levels increase the quota for private companies to reflect the private sector’s contribution to local coffers and job creation. He also suggested it should specify the punishment for anyone stirring up enmity online and defaming the private sector.

On the mainland social media platform Weibo many users welcomed the draft, which was unveiled when a raft of stimulus measures were launched recently to stabilise the property market, boost the stock market and revive confidence in the economy.

However, some questioned its effectiveness as the enforcers are supposed to be the government departments that are the targets of the law.

Bill Zhuang, who owns a private manufacturing company in the eastern province of Jiangsu, said he hoped there would be detailed measures to punish culprits violating the law.

“The law stipulates that local governments and banks should not discriminate against private companies. Anyway, they can give good reasons for granting fewer contracts or fewer loans to private companies than government-backed enterprises, as they always do,” he said.

“If the law does not publish them, our situation will not change for good,” Zhuang said.

The draft law stipulates that governments and state-owned enterprises that default on payments to private companies should compensate for their losses.

Those introducing policies without a fair competition scrutiny are subject to punishment, although it does not specify what that would be. Acts restricting or excluding private companies from government procurement should be corrected.

EU braces for Chinese trade blows, Trump doubles down on China: 7 EV reads you missed

https://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/3282264/eu-braces-chinese-trade-blows-trump-doubles-down-china-7-ev-reads-you-missed?utm_source=rss_feed

We have put together stories from our coverage on electric and new energy vehicles from the past two weeks to help you stay informed. If you would like to see more of our reporting, please consider .

European Union officials are bracing for an onslaught of retaliatory trade actions after a team of Chinese officials tasked with resolving an EV tariff row were hauled back to Beijing.

Contemporary Amperex Technology (CATL), the world’s largest maker of batteries for electric vehicles (EVs), launched a research and development centre in Hong Kong, a boon to the city’s ambition to become a global innovation hub.

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump said he would take steps to prevent Chinese carmakers from selling vehicles in the US as part of his plan to save the American auto industry.

China’s electric-vehicle (EV) producers are cranking up price discounting to an unprecedented level this year to lure buyers. They are boosting sales at the expense of profit margins, leaving many struggling with cash crunches.

Hon Hai Precision Industry said that it will take years to build up its nascent automotive arm as electric vehicle (EV) sales slow globally, while its business of making and selling artificial intelligence (AI) servers with Nvidia chips has been booming and growing fast.

Electric-vehicle maker BYD has made it clear buyers are free to choose other service providers to repair and maintain their cars without the risk of losing their lifetime battery warranty, Hong Kong’s competition watchdog has said after raising concerns about the issue.

Electric vehicle (EV) dealers did brisk sales on the mainland during the “golden week” holiday, with the soon-to-end government subsidies pushing buyers to hasten their decisions.

Chinese economist calls for massive stimulus, saying 2008’s 4 trillion yuan not enough

https://www.scmp.com/economy/policy/article/3282480/chinese-economist-calls-massive-stimulus-saying-2008s-4tr-yuan-not-enough?utm_source=rss_feed

To maximise the impact of any new stimulus package, Beijing should be ready to spend bigger than the 4 trillion yuan (US$564.7 billion) rolled out after the 2008 financial crisis – but the long-term consequences of that previous response, said outspoken economist Yu Yongding, should remind policymakers to think and act carefully.

For the best chance to re-energise the country’s economy in one fell swoop, the former adviser to the People’s Bank of China said in an exclusive interview, the government should quantify its stimulus plan as soon as possible – ideally with a detailed timetable.

“With only three months left in the year, rushing into battle may have serious side effects,” Yu said. “If it’s too late this year, we can continue next year. Actions cannot be rushed, but the release of policy signals cannot be delayed.”

The world’s second-largest economy had displayed a reluctance to unleash an all-out stimulus over the past decade, despite multiple trying moments.

The measures from late 2008 are now thought to have brought a new set of persistent problems, including industrial overcapacity, extensive debt burdens on local governments, an overreliance on the property market and rampant risk in the financial system.

But a shift in direction has been observed since last month. Most notably, the Politburo – a major decision-making body of the Communist Party – convened an unexpected meeting on September 26, where President Xi Jinping exhorted officials across the nation to prioritise economic revival and help achieve the country’s annual growth target of “around 5 per cent”.

A firm advocate of fiscal stimulus, Yu said a new round of spending should exceed the figure from 2008, as the current scale of China’s economy eclipses its earlier size.

Regarding a suggestion from another former top adviser – at least 10 trillion yuan (US$1.42 trillion) in stimulus over the next year or two via the issuance of special treasury bonds – Yu said it is “worth consideration”.

At present, Yu said, China does not need to worry over a surge in government leverage resulting from an expansionary fiscal policy, nor a fiscal crisis combined with inflation.

“As long as a country’s economic growth rate is higher than the interest rate, the country’s debt is sustainable,” he said.

Yu said China is among the countries with the best fiscal position globally, with a high savings rate, net foreign assets of nearly US$3 trillion and foreign exchange reserves of over US$3 trillion.

“China is far from the point where it needs to worry about fiscal sustainability,” he said. “What China should worry about is the continued decline in the economic growth rate.”

Although the country’s top economic planner and finance ministry took turns giving high-profile press conferences last week, both stayed tight-lipped about the specific scale of a stimulus plan. A higher fiscal budget or bond quota would require approval from the country’s top legislature.

But the ministry did indicate its priorities for the near future in its conference on Saturday, including debt relief for local governments, capital replenishment for major state-owned banks and fiscal support for the property market.

The most positive message conveyed on Saturday was a one-off debt ceiling increase for local governments to swap their hidden debts, Yu said, as it reflects a shift away from a pro-cyclical approach in which new investments are banned until previous debts are cleared.

“Ramping up fiscal efforts must coincide with reducing debt pressure on local governments. The central government should bleed cash and help local governments,” he said. “We can’t make local governments unable to operate.”

At its conference on October 8, the National Development and Reform Commission – China’s top economic planner – made clear the economy will be boosted through more active government spending on infrastructure projects, with urban renewal atop the priority list.

Although weak domestic consumption remains a matter of concern, plans unveiled so far have yet to include demand-side measures like direct cash payments or vouchers to households.

Yu said while such measures could be used in special circumstances, in normal times it may form a negative incentive mechanism that lowers the motivation to work and increases unemployment.

On the supply side, Yu said China’s infrastructure investment is far from saturated, as there is still a need for public service facilities like urban drainage or elderly care.

Even in the transport sector, where China has seen dazzling growth, he said there is still demand for seaports and small airports.

One major criticism levelled at infrastructure investments by local governments in China has been the resultant waste and corruption, as some pour the money into building luxe facilities of little use to residents – an issue Yu acknowledged.

“We must find ways to prevent this from happening again,” he said.

Hundreds of Chinese men arrested in Sri Lanka over online scams

https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3282534/hundreds-chinese-men-arrested-sri-lanka-over-online-scams?utm_source=rss_feed

Police in Sri Lanka have arrested more than 230 Chinese men accused of targeting international banks in online scams, the foreign minister said, with help from security officials sent by Beijing.

Vijitha Herath said police raids over the past week had also seized 250 computers and 500 mobile phones used in the alleged scams, with investigations into how much had been stolen still under way.

“They have mainly targeted foreign banks and financial institutions,” Herath said on Tuesday of the gangs targeted in the raids.

China’s embassy in Colombo said they had sent a “working group” of security officials to carry out “special operations” with Sri Lankan police.

“A large number of criminal suspects were arrested,” the embassy said in a statement, adding that “repatriation and other work” were ongoing.

The biggest raid was on Saturday, when police arrested 126 Chinese men, as well as two from Vietnam and one each from Thailand and the Philippines.

On Sunday, Deputy Inspector-General Nihal Thalduwa said nearly 200 men had been taken into custody at four locations during raids carried out since October 6.

Thalduwa said forensic experts were analysing the electronic devices that had been seized.

“We suspect that they were operating online scams from these locations,” Thalduwa told reporters in Colombo. “Their victims include people in Sri Lanka as well as those overseas.”

He said investigations were moving slowly due to language issues in questioning the suspects, but the authorities sought help from the Chinese embassy in Colombo.

Sri Lanka has a strong telecommunication infrastructure and was the first in South Asia to unroll a 5G network, in April 2019, three years before the country’s financial meltdown.

The embassy statement said China’s crackdown on cybercriminals at home may have pushed some to seek criminal opportunities abroad.

“China stands ready to further strengthen law enforcement cooperation with Sri Lanka”, the statement said.

In June, police arrested another 200 suspects, mainly Indians, who were also accused of operating online financial scams.

Thalduwa said the suspects had entered the island as tourists and, in most cases, were overstaying their visas.

Qualcomm’s bid to buy Intel hinges partly on US election, China scrutiny, sources say

https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3282532/qualcomms-bid-buy-intel-hinges-partly-us-election-china-scrutiny-sources-say?utm_source=rss_feed

Qualcomm is likely to wait until after the US presidential election in November before deciding whether to pursue an offer to buy Intel, people familiar with the matter said.

San Diego-based Qualcomm wants greater clarity on the new occupant of the White House before deciding its next move because of the impact any future administration would have on the antitrust landscape and America’s relationship with China, according to the people, who asked not to be identified discussing confidential information.

Qualcomm could opt to wait until after the inauguration of the new US president in January before deciding how to proceed, given the many complexities of a potential transaction involving Intel, some of the people said.

A combination of Qualcomm and Intel, whose products are key to the digital framework supporting everyday life – from smartphones to electric vehicles – would almost certainly draw intense scrutiny from antitrust regulators in the US and around the world. That includes China, a key market for both Qualcomm and Intel.

Qualcomm made a preliminary approach to Intel on a possible takeover of its struggling rival in September. In the same month, the company made informal inquiries with antitrust regulators in China to gauge their stance on any potential deal, some of the people said.

Qualcomm has not received any feedback from Chinese authorities, which are waiting to see if the company actually makes a formal bid, they said.

Intel is at the heart of the US government’s plan for a home-grown chip-making renaissance, making the political backing for any deal crucial. The Biden administration has consistently framed the importance of its chip-making policy in national security terms.

Intel is in line to get the biggest allocation of funding under the 2022 Chips and Science Act, if it goes ahead with all of its factory building plans. Qualcomm has been speaking with US regulators and believes an all-American combination could allay any concerns, people familiar with the matter have previously said.

Making a bid after the election may bring other advantages for Qualcomm.

Intel will report third-quarter earnings later this month. If that follows the pattern of the disappointing announcement of three months ago and the impact it had on the potential target’s stock price, it could make a deal considerably less expensive for Qualcomm. This time around, analysts are predicting another net loss in excess of US$1 billion for Intel.

Qualcomm’s deliberations are ongoing and there is no certainty that the company will decide to pursue an offer for Intel and the timing could change, the people said. Representatives for Qualcomm and Intel declined to comment, while the State Administration for Market Regulation in China did not respond to requests for comment.

Under chief executive officer Pat Gelsinger, Intel has been working on an expensive plan to remake itself and bring in new products, technology and outside customers. As part of a recently announced shake-up, Intel intends to turn its programmable chip division into a stand-alone business and sell shares to the public or seek an investor for it.

Apollo Global Management has offered to make a multibillion-dollar investment in Intel, Bloomberg News reported last month, providing the chip maker with a vote of confidence in its turnaround strategy and a possible alternative to any takeover by Qualcomm.

What PLA Navy and China Coast Guard drills near Taiwan reveal about Beijing’s plans

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3282493/what-pla-navy-and-china-coast-guard-drills-near-taiwan-revealed-about-beijings-plans?utm_source=rss_feed

Beijing’s massive military drills around Taiwan on Monday revealed significantly improved coordination between its navy and coastguard, according to observers, who say this could be key to mainland China’s blockade strategy for the island.

A record number of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft approached Taiwan in the 13-hour exercise dubbed “Joint Sword-2024B”, with the aircraft carrier Liaoning launching fighter jets towards the island from the east.

An unprecedented 17 coastguard vessels were part of the drills, as reported by Taiwan, compared to only seven deployed in Joint Sword-2024A drills in May, Beijing’s last major exercise staged around the self-governed island. That followed Taiwanese leader William Lai Ching-te’s inauguration speech which Beijing slammed as provocative.

Moreover, according to Taiwan’s ministry of defence, the coastguard ships were also operating alongside PLA naval vessels on a roughly 1:1 ratio in each area of operation, north, south and west of Taiwan and in the Taiwan Strait.

According to Fu Qianshao, a military analyst and former PLA officer, the arrangement revealed close coordination between the two forces.

“The coastguard vessels serve as a critical supplementary force to the PLA and could play an important role in blockading ports and certain areas in a potential cross-strait conflict,” Fu said.

“For instance, the coastguard could prevent a foreign commercial ship from forcing its way into Taiwanese ports … This exercise demonstrates its coordination in joint operations with the military.”

The China Coast Guard (CCG), which was placed under military leadership in 2018, is one of the largest and best-armed forces of its kind in the world.

It has regularly conducted law enforcement patrols near Taiwan since earlier this year, including the Joint Sword-2024A exercises in May, when it deployed vessels near two Taiwan-controlled islets and also to the east of the island.

The deployment of coastguards showed “a wartime posture”, Hong Kong military commentator Liang Guoliang said.

“The four coastguard task forces [in the exercise] were tasked with guiding and assisting merchant vessels to leave the conflict zone, as their first major task, while their second was to participate in the blockade of Taiwan,” according to Liang.

Former Taiwanese navy captain Lu Lishi also said the navy-coastguard coordination was the “highlight” of Monday’s drills.

The deployment of the 10,000-tonne CCG 2901, the coastguard’s largest ship, to the east of Taiwan was significant, he said, as the vessel can remain at sea for extended periods.

Monday’s drill came just days after another speech by Lai, and Beijing said it was a response to the “provocation”.

Another highlight of the drill was the involvement of the Liaoning aircraft group to Taiwan’s east. Mainland state media footage showed J-15 fighters taking off from the carrier at night, a feat seen as adding to the PLA’s capabilities to stop possible foreign interventions.

Liang said the drills involving the Liaoning were more representative of a real combat scenario, compared with a PLA drill in April last year, when the aircraft carrier Shandong was deployed east of Taiwan.

“A notable difference this time was that the Liaoning was participating more directly, rather than remaining in a state of readiness [as the Shandong did] … It was also operating closer to the predefined core area of the battlefield, with more frequent carrier-based aircraft take-offs and landings,” Liang said.

The Liaoning operated at nearly its maximum speed to arrive in the exercise area after departing from the southern Sanya naval base days earlier, indicating the highest level of combat readiness and the ability to respond quickly and effectively in battle, he added.

Military commentator Song Zhongping said Monday’s drills also signalled the PLA’s ability to control the strategic Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines by deploying its Liaoning aircraft carrier in the waterway.

There was a “key consideration that the US and other foreign powers may use the military bases in the Philippines to suppress China, especially to hinder China from resolving the Taiwan issue”, according to Song.

He said the latest exercise showed that the PLA could mobilise troops, including the Rocket Force, to implement a blockade near the Bashi Channel.

A record 153 PLA aircraft were detected near Taiwan from 5am on Monday to 6am on Tuesday, the island’s defence ministry said. Over 70 per cent of them entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, according to the ministry.

The tally was more than double the record for daily PLA aircraft sorties reported near Taiwan since last September, when 66 aircraft were detected on July 10.

A three-day period during the Joint Sword exercise in April 2023 featured between 70 and 91 aircraft daily, while the two-day drill in May after Lai’s inaugural speech involved up to 62 jets daily.

The exercises in April last year were launched after Lai’s predecessor Tsai Ing-wen met then House speaker Kevin McCarthy during a transit stop in the United States, drawing protests from Beijing.

The record numbers this time round showed Beijing was testing the command and control, as well as coordination of different types of aircraft including the J-20 fighter jet, former PLA officer Fu noted.

Song said even though the drill lasted for just a day, its scale “was far from restrained”.

Rather, it was more targeted, as “the shorter the conflict, the stronger is the problem-solving ability demonstrated”, said Song, a former PLA instructor.

Lu from Taiwan said Monday’s drill was “limited”, in line with what he believed was a consensus between the United States and China on security issues in Asia ahead of the US elections next month.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. The US, like most countries, does not recognise self-governed Taiwan as an independent state, but is opposed to any attempt to take it by force and is committed to arming it for defence.

China looks to tackle problems for debt-ridden local authorities with water tax reforms

https://www.scmp.com/economy/policy/article/3282549/china-looks-tackle-problems-debt-ridden-local-authorities-water-tax-reforms?utm_source=rss_feed

China’s Ministry of Finance said on Tuesday that it would expand the Water Tax Interim Measures from 10 provinces to the entire nation, effective from December 1, amid efforts to provide debt-ridden local authorities with more revenue.

The measures aim to safeguard water resources, curb groundwater over-exploitation, ease the growing supply-demand imbalance and refine the taxation system, according to the ministry.

“All water resource tax revenues will be allocated to local governments to boost their autonomous financial resources, broaden local tax bases and appropriately expand the management authority over local taxes,” it said.

The move, though, is believed to be largely symbolic as the new increase for local authorities are estimated to be only billions of yuan, far lower than their confirmed debt of 43.6 trillion yuan (US$6.1 trillion) and speculated so-called hidden debt of trillions of yuan.

However, it marked a further intention to help restore local fiscal capabilities, with other measures including increased transfer payments from central government and other local taxes such as consumption tax.

Income from water resource fees are divided between the central and local governments, with the central government receiving 10 per cent of the revenue.

China initiated a pilot water resource tax in Hebei province, a water-stressed northern region, in 2016, and officially integrated the tax into national legislation in 2019.

The new 33-point plan exempts rural organisations from taxation on water drawn from local reservoirs, along with domestic water use and water used for public safety or drought relief.

It will set high tax rates for groundwater usage in water-stressed areas, as well as for industries like car washes, bathhouses, golf courses and ski resorts.

Manufacturing enterprises, which account for 16 per cent of the country’s water usage, must meet specific efficiency standards to qualify for a 20 per cent tax reduction in the following year.

“The tax aims to raise enterprises’ awareness and motivation for water conservation, encouraging them to enhance water use efficiency through conservation initiatives and technological innovation,” the finance ministry said.

China has long grappled with water scarcity and uneven distribution between its northern and southern regions, posing a threat to its agriculture, energy and manufacturing sectors.

The country has 20 per cent of the global population, while possessing only 7 per cent of the world’s freshwater resources, according to the World Bank.

After the implementation of a water fee-to-tax scheme, Hebei province experienced a 40 per cent reduction in water consumption per 10,000 yuan (US$1,405) of gross domestic product and a 44 per cent decrease in groundwater extraction from 2015 to 2023, according to government-backed China Tax News last month.

Over the past eight years, the number of water resource taxpayers in Hebei province has risen from 17,000 in 2016 to 21,000 in 2023, resulting in a total collection of 14.917 billion yuan (US$2.1 billion) in water resource taxes.

At a media briefing on Saturday, the finance ministry vowed to provide a one-off large increase of bond quotas to swap hidden liabilities bothering provincial and municipal governments.

Local fiscal revenue rose by only 0.4 per cent from a year earlier to 8.24 trillion yuan in the first eight months, government data showed.

Income from land sales, meanwhile, dropped by 25.4 per cent year on year to 2.02 trillion yuan during the same period.

China ‘crying wedding’ custom sees women singing farewell laments for life they leave behind

https://www.scmp.com/news/people-culture/article/3282316/china-crying-wedding-custom-sees-women-singing-farewell-laments-life-they-leave-behind?utm_source=rss_feed

The tradition of a “Crying Marriage” – a ceremonial practice involving sobbing and singing by the bride and her family – is attracting renewed and significant attention in China.

Practised by the Tujia, Yi, and Zhuang minorities and popular in provinces like central Hubei and southern Guangdong, the tradition is believed to have originated during China’s Warring States period (476 BC-221 BC).

When a Zhao princess was married off to the King of Yan, her mother cried out in sorrow and expressed concerns for her daughter’s distant marriage.

“May you never be sent back,” she said, marking the beginning of the wedding custom.

The ritual typically begins about a week before the wedding.

The bride may cry intermittently during this period, especially when relatives or neighbours visit and bring gifts. Her tears are seen as an expression of gratitude.

Emotions reach a peak on the night before the wedding ceremony and continue until the bride is taken to her new home on the big day.

Among the Yi people, there are two primary forms of the ritual.

The first is “Mother and Daughter Crying” where the mother offers comfort, blessings, and advice and the daughter responds tearfully.

The other form involves the bride crying with her female companions.

In certain areas in Chuxiong Yi autonomous prefecture in southwestern China’s Yunnan province, this occurs several days before the wedding when the bride’s friends – married and unmarried – gather at dusk to cry and sing.

If a bride does not cry at her wedding she could be perceived as being ungrateful or lacking a proper education, and she might be reprimanded by her mother.

Songs and lyrics are always part of the ceremony, either traditional or improvised by the bride and her companions.

The lyrics typically include expressions of gratitude towards parents, reflections on sibling bonds, lamenting the carefree days of youth, and concerns about married life ahead.

A key part of the crying ceremony is known as “scolding the matchmaker,” which is seen as a symbolic protest against traditional marital constraints.

Historically, women had little say in choosing their partners, so “scolding the matchmaker” provided them a rare opportunity to express their discontent and vent frustration before entering into marriage.

Today, the Crying Marriage tradition still holds significance among certain ethnic minorities in China, such as the Tujia and Gelao people.

However, the practice is not unique to China.

In similar customs in India and Pakistan, the bride’s tears are viewed as a sign of her filial piety and are believed to contribute to a happier marriage.

First king in China? Archaeologists uncover extra-large tomb at Neolithic burial site

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3282556/first-king-china-archaeologists-uncover-extra-large-tomb-neolithic-burial-site?utm_source=rss_feed

Chinese archaeologists have unearthed a tomb dating back some 5,000 years, which they believe is older than any similar discovery and that may belong to a prehistoric king.

The tomb, in central China’s Henan province, is part of a burial site that was discovered in late 2021 at Wangzhuang village, in the county-level city of Yongcheng, and which has been yielding extraordinary finds since last year.

State news agency Xinhua said on Monday that the latest tomb, numbered M27, is an “extra-large” structure with a total area of more than 17 square metres (183 sq ft) featuring both internal and external coffins.

Archaeologists uncovered a wealth of grave items, including more than 100 pieces of pottery and nearly 200 small jade ornaments, as well as bone tools and animal remains such as pig mandibles, which symbolise wealth, according to Xinhua.

Zhu Guanghua, an associate professor at Capital Normal University’s School of History who was involved in the dig, said the latest discovery “indicates that the Wangzhuang ruins are not an ordinary settlement, but rather the capital of a prehistoric kingdom”.

The ancient burial complex is estimated to cover a total area of 120,000 square metres (12 hectares), stretching 400 metres (1,312ft) from north to south and 300 metres (984ft) from east to west.

Villagers were refurbishing Wangzhuang’s ponds when they stumbled upon the first of a series of tombs in the side of a pit, with a number of jade rings, pendants and discs, as well as turquoise ornaments, bone arrowheads and pottery.

Researchers from institutions including the Henan Provincial Institute of Cultural Heritage and Archaeology, Capital Normal University in Beijing and the Institute of Archaeology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences have been carrying out joint excavations since February last year.

Of the 45 tombs discovered this year at the site, 27 have been excavated, yielding a wealth of artefacts.

“The richness of the burial objects is closely linked to the size of the tombs, indicating that a clear social hierarchy and class stratification had already emerged,” said Liu Haiwang, leader of the joint archaeological team, in his interview with Xinhua.

Liu added that the exquisite pottery, stone tools and jade artefacts “vividly demonstrate the division of labour and the level of productivity at that time”.

The tombs at the Wangzhuang site belong to the mid-to-late period of the Neolithic Dawenkou Culture that appeared mainly in some of China’s central provinces, including Shandong, Anhui, Henan and Jiangsu, from around 4300 to 2500 BC.

According to Zhu, the types and styles of artefacts suggest the Wangzhuang site was a witness to the convergence of China’s eastern and western cultures.

In March, China’s National Cultural Heritage Administration selected Wangzhuang as one of the country’s “top 10 new archaeological discoveries of 2023”.

In another significant find, archaeologists announced in mid-April that they had unearthed a massive 2,200-year-old Warring States Period tomb, the largest and “highest-level” of its kind from the state of Chu.

The researchers hypothesised that the tomb may have belonged to King Kaolie, who reigned over the state of Chu for more than two decades from 262 BC to 238 BC.

Taiwan and trade: how China sees its future with the US after the election

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/oct/16/china-us-trade-harris-trump

Deciphering the obscure machinations of elite politics is a pursuit that western China-watchers are all too familiar with. But as the US election approaches, it is analysts in China who are struggling to read the tea leaves on what differentiates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump when it comes to their stance on the US’s biggest geopolitical rival.

Commentators are calling it the vibes election. For Beijing, despite the cheers and whoops of Harris’s campaign, her vibes are largely similar to Trump’s.

“Harris will continue Biden’s policies” on China, says Wang Yiwei, a professor of international studies at Renmin University in Beijing. What are Biden’s policies? He is a “Trumpist without the Trump”, says Wang.

Harris has done little to dispel the belief that her stance on China will be largely the same as Biden’s, should she win the election in November. In her headline speech at the Democratic national convention on 22 August, China was mentioned just once: she promised to ensure that “America, not China, wins the competition for the 21st century”.

Harris has little foreign policy record to be judged on. But in an economic policy speech on 16 August, she emphasised her goal of “building up our middle class”, a vision that Biden has used to justify placing high tariffs on Chinese imports, extending Donald Trump’s trade war.

Beijing fundamentally does not see there being much difference between a Democratic- or Republican-controlled White House. Indeed, hawkishness on China has become one of the few bipartisan issues in US politics.

In a recent piece for Foreign Affairs, leading foreign policy commentators Wang Jisi, Hu Ran and Zhao Jianwei wrote that “Chinese strategists hold few illusions that US policy toward China might change course over the next decade … they assume that whoever is elected in November 2024 will continue to prioritise strategic competition and even containment in Washington’s approach to Beijing.” The authors predicted that although Harris’s policymaking would likely be more “organised and predictable” than Trump’s, both would be “strategically consistent”.

Jude Blanchette, a China expert at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, also says that US-China relations would remain strained, no matter who was in the White House. “The US-China relationship is trending negative irrespective of who assumes office next January, but a Trump 2.0 would likely bring significantly more economic friction owing to an almost certain trade war,” Blanchette said.

Even in areas where US-China co-operation used to be more fruitful, such as climate policies, there are concerns that such exchanges are on thin ice. In a recent briefing, Kate Logan, associate director of climate at the Asia Society Policy Institute, noted that China “seems to be placing a greater emphasis on subnational cooperation”: provincial- or state-level dialogues rather than negotiations between Washington and Beijing. This is partly driven by a concern that should Trump be re-elected, national-level climate diplomacy could be in jeopardy.

Harris’s nomination of Tim Walz, the governor of Minnestoa, has also been a curveball for China’s America-watchers. Having taught in China in 1989 and 1990, and travelled there extensively in the years since, Walz has more China experience than anyone on a presidential ticket since George HW Bush. But other than Walz’s sustained support of human rights in China, it is unclear how he could or would shape the White House’s China policy if Harris were to win in November.

More impactful would be the national security team that Harris assembles. Her current national security adviser, Philip Gordon, is a likely pick. In 2019, Gordon signed an open letter cautioning against treating China as “an enemy” of the US. Some analysts have speculated that his more recent experience inside the White House may have pushed him in a hawkish direction. But in a recent conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations, a thinktank in New York, Gordon refrained from describing China as an enemy or a threat. Instead, he repeatedly referred to the “challenge” from China – one that the US should be worried about, but that could be managed.

In a sign that Beijing and Washington still plan to stabilise relations, Biden’s national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, arrived in Beijing on Tuesday to meet with Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister. High on China’s agenda will be Taiwan, which in January elected Lai Ching-te, who is detested by Beijing, as president. Lai is from the pro-sovereignty Democratic Progressive party. For Beijing, a red line in US-China relations is US support for “separatist forces”, which it sees Lai as being an agent of.

Beijing puts adherence to its version of the “one China” principle – the notion that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China’s rightful territory – at the centre of its international diplomacy. In China’s official readout of President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Biden in November, the Taiwan issue was described as “the most important and sensitive issue in Sino-US relations”.

Certain members of the Chinese foreign policy establishment welcome the idea of a second Trump term, because they see Trump as a business-minded actor who would not be inclined to provide US resources or moral support to the cause of Taiwanese sovereignty. Wang, the Renmin University professor, says that Trump has less respect for the international alliance system than Biden, which works in China’s favour. “His allies don’t trust him very much … Taiwan is more worried about Trump,” Wang said.

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But Trump is also unpredictable. In the event of a Trump presidency, Blanchette notes, “he will be surrounded by advisers who are hawkish on China and very likely pro-Taiwan. That won’t determine his decisions, but it will shape them.”

Early in his presidential term, Trump was actually quite popular in Taiwan because of his tough stance on China. But opinions have cooled, especially after his recent comments suggesting Taiwan should pay the US to defend it. Local headlines likened him to a mobster running a protection racket.

Those same outlets have latched on to Walz, focusing on his time spent in both China and Taiwan, and his support of Tibet and Hong Kong. Some describe him as the friendly “neighbourhood uncle”.

According to a recent Brookings Institution poll, 55% of people in Taiwan think that the US will aid Taiwan’s defence, regardless of who is in the White House.

Among analysts and diplomats, there’s tentative agreement, with some saying that while the rhetoric would be very different under Trump, actual policies wouldn’t change so much.

“Obviously, the personalities are dramatically different, but US national interests are not,” said Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew school of public policy.

“Either administration is going to come in and recognise Taiwan’s innate value to the US as a democratic partner in a tough neighbourhood, as a major security partner, major trading partner, and critical supplier of ICT [information and communication technology] goods.”

Contingencies are being prepared in Taipei, but in reality, US support for Taiwan is hard-baked into laws like the Taiwan Relations Act and – deliberately – quite hard for a single administration to change on a whim.

But improving cross-strait relations probably aren’t high on Trump’s agenda, and he is unlikely to expend political capital on Taiwan.

“I think the bigger US interest, if Trump were going to expend political capital to engage Xi Jinping, would be the US economy, not to broker cross-strait peace,” said Thompson.

Experts think that a similar, America-first case could be made to Trump regarding tensions in the South China Sea: the US and the Philippines have a mutual defence treaty and the US formally recognises the Philippines’ claims to waters and islets disputed with China (as did an international tribunal in 2016). But, although there are fears about Trump’s fickle attitude towards international alliances, the previous Trump administration’s stance on the dispute was largely in line with the Biden administration’s, and the fact that about 60% of global maritime trade passes through the contested waterway makes stability there important to the US economy.

For normal people in Taiwan, the election feels like an event that could shape their futures, despite the fact that they have no say in it. Zhang Zhi-yu, a 71-year-old shopkeeper in Hualien, a city on Taiwan’s east coast, says that Trump is “crazy and irresponsible”.

But, she concludes, “It’s no use worrying about war … we’re just ordinary people. If a foreign country wants to rescue Taiwan, people like us won’t be rescued first”.

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David Lammy urged to raise human rights concerns on China trip

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/oct/16/david-lammy-human-rights-concerns-china-trip

David Lammy must “engage with China as it really is under the leadership of Xi Jinping” and raise human rights concerns during his trip to the country, UK parliamentarians who have been hit with sanctions by Beijing have said.

The foreign secretary is expected to hold high-level meetings in China this week. The visit forms part of an effort by Labour to improve relations with China after they deteriorated under successive Conservative governments. Rachel Reeves, the chancellor, plans to travel to the country next year and restart high-level economic dialogue.

The rapprochement is controversial because of human rights and security concerns about China, including its treatment of the Uyghur Muslim minority in Xinjiang and crackdown on democratic freedoms in Hong Kong.

In a letter to Lammy on Tuesday, the group of parliamentarians wrote that “Beijing is testing the UK’s resolve [and] seeking to establish new parameters for engagement”.

Beijing imposed sanctions on the group, which includes the Labour peer Helena Kennedy, in 2021 for criticising its human rights record in Xinjiang.

In their letter, the parliamentarians urge Lammy to raise the case of political prisoners in Hong Kong, including the British citizen Jimmy Lai, and the “heinous treatment” of the Uyghur community.

They call on the foreign secretary to express “deep concern” about China’s “unilateral alteration of the status quo” in Taiwan. The Chinese military held drills around Taiwan on Monday in what it called a “stern warning” against those seeking “independence” for the self-ruled island.

The Guardian reported last week that the Foreign Office had asked that a visit to the UK parliament by Tsai Ing-wen, the former Taiwanese president, be delayed so as not to anger China before Lammy’s trip. Tsai is travelling to Prague and Brussels on her first international tour since leaving office.

The letter warns that “the projected $10tn impact of a conflict over Taiwan to the global economy is intolerable and would be catastrophic for China’s standing in the world”. Taiwan, which has never been ruled by the People’s Republic of China, has grown increasingly opposed to Beijing’s claims of sovereignty over it. There are fears China will eventually try to annex the island by force.

Signatories of the letter include the former Tory leader Iain Duncan Smith, the former security minister Tom Tugendhat and the former health minister Neil O’Brien.

“We must engage with China as it really is under the leadership of Xi Jinping, not as we all hoped it would become after accession to the World Trade Organization,” they wrote. “Our own political environment means that the temptation to prioritise short-term economic advantage over UK resilience and values is strong, but will only disadvantage the UK in the long run.”

The letter urges Lammy to underline that the UK’s concerns are not a product of alignment with US foreign policy but “a result of non-negotiable values which rest at the heart of the UK national interest”.

The last foreign secretary to visit China was James Cleverly in August 2023. Earlier this year the UK and US governments accused Chinese state-backed hackers of a years-long cyber-attack targeting politicians, journalists and businesses.

In its manifesto, Labour pledged to conduct a Whitehall audit of the UK-China relationship. In the past, Labour has also committed to taking steps to recognise China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority as genocide.

Lady Kennedy and Duncan Smith are UK co-chairs of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, which is strongly critical of Beijing.

A FCDO Spokesperson said: “This government will take a consistent, long term and strategic approach to managing the UK’s relations with China, rooted in UK and global interests. We will co-operate where we can, compete where we need to, and challenge where we must.

“It is only right that we engage pragmatically with China where there are clear UK and global interests. That includes on areas where we agree and more importantly where we disagree, as the foreign ssecretary did during his meeting with Wang Yi at ASEAN.

“Foreign secretary travel will be confirmed in the usual way.”

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[Sport] Pandas from China seen exploring new home at DC Zoo

https://www.bbc.com/news/videos/cx2ljj5qr25o[Sport] Pandas from China seen exploring new home at DC Zoo

China’s ICBM test may well redraw the global security landscape

https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3281743/chinas-icbm-test-may-well-redraw-global-security-landscape?utm_source=rss_feed

China’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test last month made waves in global security circles, marking a milestone in the country’s military modernisation and revealing critical dynamics in US-led alliances in the Asia-Pacific.

While analysis has focused on the technological strides China showed, the test exposes a series of under-reported challenges, particularly around alliance dynamics, nuclear diplomacy and the shifting power balance in global arms control.

By examining these broader implications, one can see that this missile test is more than a technological show of strength; it represents a pivotal shift in nuclear strategy and alliance stability that could redefine security in the region and beyond.

China’s decision to inform the United States of the test, but not all of Washington’s regional allies, has exposed the asymmetrical information-sharing within the US alliance structure. Key US partners Japan and Taiwan were left woefully uninformed, highlighting their dependence on Washington.

Japan’s record defence budget of 7.95 trillion yen (US$53.15 billion) for the current financial year illustrates its growing concerns; it lacks an independent missile defence system to address threats like the advanced DF-31AG missile with its multi-warhead capabilities, which experts have concluded was launched in China’s ICBM test.

Taiwan, meanwhile, detected the missile’s launch but most likely lost it when it exited the island’s radar range, underscoring Taiwan’s limitations in strategic autonomy. The reliance of both Japan and Taiwan on the US complicates their defence planning, raising questions about their security resilience.

In the face of Beijing’s advances, both may feel pressure to develop independent surveillance and defence capacities, potentially reshaping their strategic dependence on the US and fragmenting alliance structures.

Notifying the US of the ICBM test reflects China’s nuanced approach to nuclear diplomacy. Unlike Russia’s recent failed missile launch, plans for which were largely opaque to international observers, China’s transparency aligns with a strategic calculus aimed at displaying a restrained yet capable nuclear posture.

This gesture not only reduced the risk of misinterpretation but also emphasised China’s confidence in its strategic reach and military capabilities. China’s willingness to be transparent, contrasted with the traditional secrecy surrounding missile tests, could prompt other major nuclear powers to adopt a more transparent stance in future military exercises and tests.

China’s advancements in ICBM technology were showcased in this launch; the missile launched is widely speculated to have had multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), giving it a significantly enhanced nuclear deterrent. While the DF-31AG has an estimated range of 12,000km, capable of striking targets across continental US, China’s DF-41 missile extends its reach even further with more payload capacity.

Such capabilities strengthen China’s second-strike capabilities and add credibility to its “minimum deterrence” posture by ensuring it can respond to threats without resorting to first-use tactics.

China’s missile success comes amid setbacks for other nuclear powers. Recent test failures including of Britain’s Trident and the US’ Minuteman III, as well as France’s successful but non-full-range-test, position China as a more reliable and capable nuclear force. This shift may push the global community to revisit the US-Russia-centric arms control framework to consider China’s capabilities in a broader, multipolar context.

China’s nuclear advancements may require new, multilateral arms control agreements that include more nuclear-armed states. As countries such as India advance their missile systems, China’s strides underscore the urgent need for an inclusive arms control framework.

The US and its allies will need to invest in defences that address the sophistication of MIRV-equipped missiles, a development likely to fuel an arms race that could heighten tensions in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s assertiveness in developing nuclear capabilities is likely to resonate with the Global South, where many countries may see Beijing as a counterbalance to Western security norms.

Countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America may interpret China’s transparent testing as a commitment to a multipolar world order, one that challenges the West’s traditional dominance in nuclear affairs. For nations seeking strategic autonomy, China’s model of restrained but transparent power could offer a compelling alternative.

China’s nuclear modernisation suggests it aims to build capabilities on a par with Russia and the US by 2035, potentially focusing on mobility, concealment and enhanced second-strike abilities.

With investments in hypersonic glide vehicles and advanced guidance systems, China’s nuclear force could evolve into a flexible deterrent able to respond to varied global threats. This reflects China’s desire for comprehensive deterrence, particularly as US containment strategies and regional alliances present growing challenges.

China’s growing nuclear capabilities and transparent signalling present an opportunity to reimagine global arms control. Beijing’s missile test – along with its calibrated transparency – departs from Cold War-era adversarial postures, suggesting a shift towards a multilateral framework that includes all major nuclear powers. This new structure could establish norms to prevent escalation and foster stability.

For US-aligned countries in the Asia-Pacific, the test underscores the need to reassess defence strategies in light of the evolving power dynamics. Japan and Taiwan may pursue self-reliant frameworks, adding complexity to US regional alliances.

For China, this test marks a step forward in nuclear modernisation and positions it as a stabilising force in global security, though it raises the stakes for future dialogue that acknowledges its role within a multipolar nuclear order.

China’s ICBM test is a defining moment that invites a renewed approach to nuclear diplomacy. The global community must embrace an inclusive, forward-looking model that accounts for the strategic realities of today’s multipolar landscape.

From China with love: coastguard’s ‘creepy’ message to Taiwan during military drills

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/15/hi-my-sweetheart-china-love-heart-propaganda-taiwan

A Chinese propaganda image dispersed during Monday’s military drills around Taiwan was supposed to send a positive message to the island’s people, but instead has been decried as weird, creepy, and akin to “sexual harassment”.

On Monday China targeted Taiwan with major military exercises, surrounding its main island and outer territories with planes and ships to practise a blockade and attack. Alongside a record number of warplanes, dozens of navy and coastguard vessels, and cyber-attacks, China also launched a torrent of propaganda.

Among video montages of soldiers rushing towards troop carriers, photos of captains staring through binoculars from the deck of a warship, and breathless editorials about “inevitable reunification”, one piece of media stood out: a love heart.

The illustration, widely shared online, depicted a satellite image of Taiwan’s main island, and a line of arrows tracking around it in the shape of a heart. Accompanying script – in the traditional Chinese characters used by Taiwan – read: “Hi my sweetheart” and “The patrol is in the shape of loving you.”

The image came from China’s coastguard, which ran what it called “law enforcement patrols” around Taiwan during Monday’s drills.

Taiwan’s coastguard officials decried the image as Chinese cognitive warfare and harassment. But it didn’t appear to have the desired impact on the Taiwanese population.

In local news the image prompted headlines. On social media it drew mostly ridicule and anger. People found the image “creepy”, and comment sections filled with vomit-emojis. Some likened the sentiment expressed to an abusive partner, while one newspaper called it “sexual harassment”.

Many were also perplexed by what appeared to be a reference to a 15-year-old Taiwanese TV drama, Hi My Sweetheart, long off the air. Some people surmised the reference was supposed to remind people of the show’s star, the local actor Rainie Yang, who has faced criticism in Taiwan for saying she is Chinese and for posting pro-China content online.

Past propaganda efforts have included crude animations of missiles striking major cities in Taiwan. In August 2022, during drills launched in retaliation for a visit by the US speaker, Nancy Pelosi, China was accused of hacking into monitors at Taiwanese train stations and convenience stores to display messages disparaging her.

How China used a ‘paper tiger’ to emerge as a nuclear weapon superpower

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3282498/how-china-used-paper-tiger-emerge-nuclear-weapon-superpower?utm_source=rss_feed

Sixty years ago, in the remote Lop Nur desert in the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, code-named “Miss Qiu”.

The test, on October 16, 1964, and the fission chain reaction it triggered, melted the top half of a 120-metre (394 feet) high iron tower. It was a pivotal moment in China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The experiment was conducted at a time of immense political challenges: the nation’s alliance with the Soviet Union had fallen apart and Moscow had withdrawn its technological help in the late 1950s, China was mired in a deep economic crisis.

But the detonation put China on a fast track to grow its nuclear strength before an important deadline that had been drafted by the United States, the former Soviet Union and Britain for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT).

The deal determined that the beginning of 1967 would be the cut-off date to identify and recognise countries with nuclear weapons as rightful “nuclear-weapon states” that had the privilege to possess the mass destructive weapon lawfully.

At the same time, while China was developing its nuclear weapons programme, it was also developing its missile technologies. On October 27, 1966, China launched a Dong Feng-2 (DF-2) medium-range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead mounted on it. The test gave China the capability of delivering a nuclear bomb by missile instead of by aircraft.

On June 17 the following year at Lop Nur, China tested its first thermonuclear device – a hydrogen bomb – a more advanced type of nuclear weapon.

As the rivalry between China and the US has grown, Washington has become wary of Beijing’s deterrence strategy by expanding its nuclear capabilities and arsenal of advanced weapons.

On Aug 6, 1946, one year after the Hiroshima bombing, Mao Zedong was interviewed by American journalist Anna Louise Strong.

“The atomic bomb is a paper tiger used by the American reactionaries to scare people,” said Mao, who described the new killer weapon as scary looking, but in fact toothless.

“Of course, the atomic bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but it is the people, not one or two new weapons, that decide the outcome of a war,” he explained.

Historian Zhang Jing of Peking University has suggested that the “tactical” gestures of defiance were intended to boost the Communist Party’s morale as civil war loomed in China, heightening fears the US may intervene and use atomic weapons.

Ten years later, Mao announced during a speech that China would pursue advanced defence technologies, including nuclear weapons.

“Not only do we need more aircraft and artillery, but also the atomic bomb. In today’s world, we cannot do without this thing if we do not want to be bullied by others,” he told a Politburo meeting in 1956.

The decision was motivated in part by the technological shortcomings of the Chinese military during the Korean war, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis that began in 1954, and the build up to the Vietnam war. But according to Zhang, Moscow’s pledges to help Beijing develop nuclear technologies also played a role.

With national strategy and policy set, recruitment of nuclear physicists like Deng Jiaxian and other scientists was soon under way. Research institutions were established and facilities were built, including the country’s first heavy water reactor and cyclotron. Uranium mines in the provinces of Jiangxi and Hunan also went into operation.

But within a few years, relations between Beijing and Moscow had soured and the Soviets halted aid and pulled their nuclear experts out of China, destroying all related documents as they left. It was June 1959, and suddenly the Chinese had to carry on by themselves. They named their independent atomic bomb programme “Project 596” to mark the bitter split.

Within the party’s leadership there were fierce debates about the bomb, with some suggesting the weapons project be put on hold as the country suffered through famine. But military chiefs at the time, such as Lin Biao, vice-chairman of the party, and Marshal Nie Rongzhen, vice-premier and head of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, insisted the programme must continue, according to the memoir of General Li Xuge, former commander of the People’s Liberation Army’s Second Artillery Force.

One of the strongest proponents was foreign minister Chen Yi, who famously said “we must get the atomic bomb even if we have to sell our pants”. In July 1960, the debates had been laid to rest with Mao telling everyone to “be determined to work on cutting-edge technologies”.

By August 1964, construction of the U-235 fuelled implosion bomb had been completed and Chinese intelligence reports suggested the Americans or even the Russians might have been considering taking action against China’s nuclear facilities. That was confirmed decades later in declassified US documents.

In response, Mao reiterated that the purpose of the atomic bomb was “to scare others, not necessarily to be used in practice”.

“Since it is for intimidation, better have it go off earlier,” he ordered on September 20. The world heard the blast less than a month later.

In January 1965, two months after China became the fifth country with nuclear weapons, Mao was asked by journalist Edgar Snow about the “paper tiger” theory again.

“A nuclear bomb kills. But in the end, it will be annihilated eventually. In this sense, a nuclear bomb is really a paper tiger,” Mao replied.

Hours after the device was detonated on October 16, 1964, the Chinese government immediately declared the “no first use” nuclear weapons policy, that it “will never, at any time or under any circumstances, be the first to use nuclear weapons”.

Beijing later added that it pledged “unconditionally not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones”, and started urging the four other nuclear powers of the time to commit to “no first use”.

Sixty years later, Sun Xiaobo, the foreign ministry’s director of the department of arms control told a UN meeting that “China has always and will continue to maintain its nuclear forces at the lowest level necessary for its national security.”

The statement was in line with the theory that opposition from people across the world would make the use of nuclear weapons taboo, according to Professor Li Bin, an international relations and nuclear arms control expert at Tsinghua University.

“Because of this nuclear taboo, nuclear-weapon states cannot initiate nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict,” he said, adding that the events of the past decades have proven that even if nuclear-weapon states struggle in a conventional conflict, they dare not use nuclear weapons to save the day

Li said China’s “no first use” commitment is based on the assumption that no one can really be the first to use nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict.

Under that premise, Chinese leaders from Mao onwards have tended to stress the political significance of nuclear weapons, rather than regarding them as an actual military weapon to be deployed in a war, Zhang said.

“In the view of the Chinese leaders, the development of nuclear weapons could lead to the development of modern science and technology … and help China regain status in the international community, on top of national security concerns,” she said.

Despite the challenges, Chinese researchers carried on: the first ICBM DF-5 full flight test was conducted in May 1980; the last atmospheric nuclear test was carried out that October; the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) JL-1 was tested in 1982; and in 1983, the Type 092 SSBN – China’s first and only nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine that was capable of firing an SLBM by then – was commissioned.

Then, in 1985, Mao’s successor, Deng Xiaoping, downsized the People’s Liberation Army by one million personnel, in a major pivot towards economic development.

“One of the important reasons why China’s reform and opening up policy was successful was the security guarantee and confidence the nuclear capabilities brought to China as a responsible major power,” Zhang said.

As the massive lay-offs were under way, Deng told the PLA to “be patient for some years”.

“I see by the end of this century we will certainly have exceeded the goal of quadrupling [the GDP], and by that time we will be financially stronger and will be able to spend a relatively large amount of money to update our military equipment,” he promised.

During the “patient years”, many major defence programmes were scrapped or suspended. But by the time China had joined the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996, the nation had conducted a total of 45 physical nuclear tests.

Based on those experiments, Chinese scientists had finished building a neutron weapon in 1988, confirmed possession of a miniaturised hydrogen bomb in 1999, constructed solid-fuel nuclear-capable ballistic missiles – the DF-21 and DF-31 – as well as the SLBM JL-2, and had finally fielded sea-based nuclear capabilities with the JL-1A on the Type 092 submarine.

By 1999, as Deng had predicted, China’s economy was booming, and the military budget began to soar over. Most of the money has been spent on conventional capabilities. China maintains a “minimum nuclear policy”, but its nuclear arsenal has been boosted significantly thanks to the introduction of new SSBN Type 094, the new SLBM JL-3, the DF-5C, road-mobile ICBMs DF-31AG and DF-41, nuclear-capable IRBMs DF-21D/26 and the hypersonic glider DF-17, as well as a nuclear-capable strategic bomber modified from the older platform H-6 series.

Over the past several years, as the risk of military confrontation with the West has grown, many believe China has shifted away from its “minimum deterrence” strategy, despite President Xi Jinping’s insistence that “nuclear weapons must not be used, and nuclear wars should not be fought”.

According to a Pentagon estimate last year, Beijing possessed more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023, would probably have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, and would continue growing that number until 2035, resulting in a nuclear arsenal comparable to the US and Russia.

“Compared to the PLA’s nuclear modernisation efforts a decade ago, current efforts dwarf previous attempts in both scale and complexity,” the 2023 China Military Power Report said.

Construction of at least 300 new ICBM silos in northwestern China was probably completed in 2022, with some of them armed. Alongside new fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities, China has been expanding its number of land, sea and air-based nuclear delivery platforms, while investing in and constructing the infrastructure necessary to support further expansion of its nuclear forces, including DF-5C and JL-3 missiles, according the report.